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The Politicization of Development Aid to Education After September 11

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The international development community has not yet been swept up into the war on terror, but it stands on the threshold. The international development architecture is already being transformed. Donor governments must act quickly to ensure that their development aid mission to deliver effective aid and to meet specific human development goals—even as they pursue other goals—stays at the forefront of the emerging aid regime.

Introduction

The events of September 11, 2001 appear to be radically altering the geopolitical and geostrategic activities of the dominant Western powers and posing a challenge to the global consensus that emerged toward the end of the last century around the United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Within the space of three years, two major wars were fought by U.S.-led coalitions on two predominantly Islamic countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of these conflicts remain politically, socially, and militarily unresolved. Furthermore, the terror bombings in Bali, Madrid, and London have shaken the foundations of Western conceptions of internal security and reframed debates on freedom of speech, information, and movement. This shift in global geopolitics is of great importance to issues related to international aid, development, and education, yet the literatures on these issues remain sparse and embryonic. In this chapter we examine the changing relationships among education, international development aid, and the merging of security and development. In particular we speculate on the possibility that the War on Terror, just like the predecessor conflict the Cold War, threatens to prioritize geopolitics as the new rationale for development policy with potentially damaging effects for the promotion of a more needs-based global development policy that concentrates on the poorest and most needy countries and population sectors.

Merging Security and Development

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increase in conflict in many low-income countries, which predates the events of September 11, 2001. Throughout this period there has also been a reconceptualization of the relationship between development and security, which while still ongoing, poses a challenge to agencies working in these two separate fields. This has had serious consequences, not least in the blurring of the line between military and security interests and development and humanitarian activities. The shift toward the securitization of development emerged out of the changing global security situation after the end of the Cold War. Despite initial optimism of a peace dividend, conflict and war did not disappear:

Immediately after the end of the Cold War there was a rise in major conflicts in every region except Latin America, followed by a fall in each region from the mid-1990s. At the end of the 1990s, there was a resurgence of serious conflict in Africa; in 1998, the number of serious conflicts was at the same level as at the peak in the early 1990s. Africa suffered by far the largest number of major conflicts during the 1990s, with more than 40% of the total. However, lesser conflicts (those with deaths of 25–1000 annually, and more than 1000 cumulatively) were concentrated in Asia.

Central to this process was the appearance of what has been termed new wars, which differed significantly from Cold War era conflicts and required radically different local,
Conflict in low-income countries as a percentage of total conflicts increased during the 1990s, with 40 percent taking place in Africa. Most disconcerting of all is that 9 out of the 10 of the lowest countries in the HDI (Human Development Index) experienced conflict during the last decade.

Picciotto notes the difficulty of merging development and security:

...until recently, security and development issues have been framed in isolation from one another. The development discourse has focused on economic management and social development while national security strategies have relied on assessments of geopolitical threats and the design of military responses. For diplomats and defence specialists, security still aims largely at the protection of the homeland against hostile states. By contrast, for aid donors and voluntary development agencies, human security is defined in terms of access to productive employment, health and education, social safety nets, etc. The end result is that more often than not aid has yet to be combined with other policy instruments in a coherent package.

While Picciotto treats the merging of security and development as a difficult but necessary task, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as Christian Aid question whether these two different and largely separate concerns should be coordinated together at all. Of greatest concern is that aid workers and relief organizations begin to be seen as mere adjuncts to the broader military and security concerns of the most powerful nations so reminiscent of the conduct of the Cold War:

Aid has always, to some extent, been given with at least one eye on the self-interest of the giver—be it to secure influence, trade or strategic resources. But the past 15 years have seen a marked change, advocated for and applauded by Christian Aid, towards vital aid funds being far better targeted at alleviating poverty. Now, however, we seem poised to return to some of the worst excesses of the recent past, when whole nations and regions were blighted by the subsuming of their interests to a global crusade. Aid was then allotted on the basis of where a country stood in the great Cold War confrontation.

Nine days after the New York attacks, in a speech to the U.S. Congress, President Bush set the tone for policy to come in the post 9/11 period when he stated: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." He went on to say that the United States will direct every resource at our command—every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war—to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror network.

In 2003, the then head of USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), Andrew Natsios, made explicit what merging U.S. foreign policy, security, and aid meant for U.S.-funded NGOs, as Klein notes:

On May 21 in Washington, Andrew Natsios, the head of USAID, gave a speech blasting U.S. NGOs for failing to play a role many of them didn’t
realize they had been assigned: doing public relations for the U.S. government. According to InterAction, the network of 160 relief and development NGOs that hosted the conference, Mr. Natsios was “irritated” that starving and sick Iraqi and Afghan children didn’t realize that their food and vaccines were coming to them courtesy of George W. Bush. From now on, NGOs had to do a better job of linking their humanitarian assistance to U.S. foreign policy and making it clear that they are “an arm of the U.S. government.” If they didn’t, InterAction reported, “Natsios threatened to personally tear up their contracts and find new partners.”

This preoccupation by USAID represents a broader concern of the U.S. government that there is an image problem necessitating increased public diplomacy to tell “America’s assistance story to the world” and win over the hearts and minds of the international community. This reflects growing concern on the part of powerful states, particularly the United States, to be seen individually and visibly acting in the humanitarian and development field, which threatens to reduce willingness to pool funds in multilateral institutions in the long term. This is exemplified in the creation by the United States of new high-profile initiatives, such as the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which bypasses multilateral organizations working on the same issues.

The MCA is not the only new mechanism for US aid delivery. Indeed, a small and decreasing percentage of US aid tends to be channelled through multilateral institutions. In 2004 this dropped to 5 per cent of US aid flows, as US bilateral aid increased more rapidly than multilateral aid. While it has continued to fund its existing multilateral commitments, assistance to Iraq and the fight against HIV/AIDS bear witness to the same trend reflected in the creation of the MCA: a turn towards new mechanisms which eschew multilateral cooperation and the technical expertise and experience concentrated in existing aid-directing institutions.

While the United States was the most active in initially promoting the merging of security and development, the EU (European Union) quickly followed by reinterpreting the relationship. Javier Solana, the EU’s head of common foreign and security policy, speaking to heads of state at the European Council in 2003 stated:

European assistance programmes, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments such as the European Development Fund. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.

The most notable change has been the definition of what constitutes official development assistance (ODA). This definition is controlled and regulated by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and for the first time in its history has recently allowed certain military and security funding to be directed via the aid budget. As Picciotto notes:

The DAC strictures on the types of aid eligible for Official Development Aid (ODA) status have been adjusted in partial compliance with the wishes of donors who wish to allocate aid funds to programs managed by the military,
development training for security forces and security sector reform assistance programs that involve working with military establishments. xvii

While the current changes have been significant, consensus has not as yet been reached on two further key proposals that could radically alter ODA budgets and allow funding for training the military in nonmilitary matters and peacekeeping expenditures. These issues will be revisited in the DAC High Level Meeting of Ministers and Heads of Aid Agencies in 2007.

Paradoxically, attempts surrounding the coordination of policy related to the MDGs have been eclipsed by coordination of security policy:

…coherence is now emerging in one area which may pose more of a risk to development assistance than the lack of it. Following the search for greater coherence across agencies to meet human security and development objectives in the 1990s (with very limited success), real coherence is emerging—centred not on a development agenda but rather on achieving global and regional security imperatives which cut across and often run counter to the pursuit of human security and development. xviii

In the rest of this chapter we examine the relationships among this new security environment, development aid, and education. A key question posed within the literature is whether the post–September 11 period represents the beginning of a new cold war that threatens to redirect and reorganize the consensus built around setting the Millennium Development Goals xx intended to channel aid to a widely agreed set of development outcomes. We review the impact on education aid, not only in terms of the volume of aid flows and their geographical dispersion, but also on the type of educational interventions. In all aspects we argue that there is evidence of a shift, though it is too early to draw any definitive conclusions, on the future trajectories of educational aid and development policy more generally.

**Approaches to Security and Development**

The literature reveals diverse responses to the threat of terrorism and conflict, largely as a result of the different views as to the underlying rationale for what causes security problems and conflict and what type of interventions might be appropriate. xx Much of this literature refers to the new wars that have emerged, which involve nonstate actors and intra-or trans-state conflict—the War on Terror being one exemplary case.

Picciotto xxi lays out three broad theoretical approaches to the relationship between development and security, which we now develop in order to gain some insight into the possible relationships between the two. The first draws on the modernization theorist, Samuel Huntington xxii and his thesis surrounding a “clash of civilizations.” The second draws on the work of Mark Duffield xxiii and explores the relationship between structural inequalities within the global economy and polity and violence. The third draws on the work of Paul Collier and explores intrastate conflict from a neoliberal rational choice perspective, where violent acts are regarded as generated by individual motives of greed. Each of these underlying theories, as we will show, is likely to lead to very different developmental and educational policy interventions in relation to the issue of the War on Terror.
Clash of Civilizations

Huntington’s post Cold War work argued that while previous conflicts engaged “princes,” “nation states,” and then “ideologies” (Cold War), today’s conflicts are located around civilizations. He suggests that cultural differences have become the key driver of global insecurity both within and between states, while the key conflict is between Islam and Christianity.

Within this worldview, one can see how educational policy interventions would likely be targeted at addressing the cultural obstacles and differences that divide the two groups. This can help us understand why, in the present period, the central thrust of USAID’s educational aid thinking is directed particularly, though not exclusively, toward altering perceptions of the West within Islamic societies. According to USAID’s administrator for Asia and the Near East, James Kunder, “our current education approach responds to the overall goal of moderating radical intolerance and anti-Western ideologies.”

Kunder clarifies this by recognizing the need for “a multi-sectoral strategy that fosters socio-political stability and economic growth.” In sum, this represents an important policy shift from the 1980s where it was centrally preoccupied with neoliberal reforms. Kunder points to the increases in education spending that have emanated from this:

Since 2001, USAID’s education portfolio in the Near East and South Asian region has dramatically expanded from 1 to 13 programs. The budget for education in the following 13 countries rose from $99.5 million in FY [fiscal year] 2002 to nearly $274.5 million in FY 2004: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt, India, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, West Bank/Gaza, and Yemen.

In terms of programs, Kunder mentions the translation and broadcasting of an Arabic version of Sesame Street across Egypt (Alam Simsim) and Bangladesh (Sisimpur) These programs will “reach as many as 4 million pre-school age children who will watch Sisimpur in Bangladesh, which premiered on April 15, 2005. Alam Simsim reaches 86% of rural Egyptian children and 45% of their mothers. Program themes include learning to be tolerant, practicing good hygiene and getting a head start in school.”

There has also been a parallel increase in funding for educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and the Muslim World:

The President’s Budget also supports the Department of State’s efforts to communicate our values abroad by providing more than $1.2 billion for public diplomacy programs to inform, engage, and support freedom-loving people around the world. For example, the Department of State will fund annual exchanges of about 35,000 Americans and people from other countries to share perspectives on our policies, people, values, and society.

Evidence from the 2005 U.S. budget also identifies the need to use education as a vehicle for addressing U.S. security concerns:

For there to be security in the long run—both in the Greater Middle East and here at home—we must marshal the energy and ideals upon which our Nation was founded and work to promote democracy in the region. The President’s Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) promotes political,
economic, and educational reform efforts in the Middle East, especially focused on opportunities for women and youth. MEPI funds grants, partnerships, training, and technical assistance. The President proposes to increase funding for this important initiative in 2005 to $150 million. xxix

Many commentators have noted the role played by the U.S. government’s National Endowment for Democracy (NED) during the Cold War. xxx It is also possible to see its central role in the new post-9/11 era:

The President also proposes to double funding to $80 million in 2005 for the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) for a Greater Middle East Leadership and Democracy initiative. The Endowment is a grant-making foundation that distributes funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting democracy abroad. NED focuses on democracy building through civic education, developing political parties, encouraging a free press, and promoting human rights. xxxi

There have also been shifts in U.S.-funded media broadcasting; once focused on the Soviet Union and its allies; it is now shifting toward the Middle East and Asia:

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) broadcasts news and information throughout Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and to Cuba, and provides information on U.S. policies and activities, as well as cultural and educational programming. Since 2001, BBG has shifted its funding to focus on broadcasting to regions that are the most critical in the War on Terror, including the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the Pacific. This includes revamping Arabic radio broadcasting to the Middle East and launching a new Arabic satellite TV network. BBG has also revamped Persian radio broadcasting to Iran to appeal to broader audiences. xxxii

These kinds of interventions, if informed by a Huntington conceptualization of the problem, can be viewed as oriented more toward changing perceptions than altering the inequalities that exist in the world. One key document produced by the U.S. Government Accountability Office xxxiii addressed the issue of the “anti-Americanism” that is “spreading and deepening around the world” xxxiv and recommended setting up “a national communications strategy” to coordinate interagency contact with the rest of the world. Implicit in the USAID conceptualization is that projects address the “hearts and minds” of poor population groups, not the underlying structural inequalities which, according to Duffield, xxxv contribute to insecurity and conflict.

**Structural Inequalities and (In)security**

Duffield xxxvi argues that increased violence in many parts of the world is a product of the highly exclusionary contemporary informational economy and polity where large geographic parts of the world are marginalized. He suggests that the neoliberal global economy and its related governance mechanisms lock many groups out of the benefits of globalization and increase the likelihood of entry into illicit activities such as crime and violence. This argument is also advanced by the ILO (International Labour Organization) xxxvii and the UN (United Nations). xxxviii Intervention within this
framework is likely to address the “human security” and “insecurity” that produces violence. This kind of conceptualization is evident in all of the major donors. The DFID (Department for International Development), for instance, notes:

UK development assistance helps build global peace and stability for the longer term, by reducing inequality and exclusion, supporting the development of capable, responsible states and reducing conflict. Money spent on reducing poverty is money spent for a more secure world.  

Likewise, Australian Aid (AusAID) has a similar take. Australian policy has been deeply influenced by the events of September 11, particularly the Bali bombing, which left almost 200 Australians dead. While this preoccupation has lead to increased military and security measures, it also appears to be interpreted more broadly—addressing the inequalities, poverty, and social exclusion that have arisen over the last two decades of economic reform and transformation.

While poverty provides no justification for acts of terror, entrenched poverty can create an environment in which terrorist networks may be fostered. Terrorist leaders can exploit the frustrated, the poor and the politically and economically excluded. The aid program restricts environments conducive to terrorism by assisting the poor to access basic services, including quality and affordable education, improving their employment prospects and helping them cope with risk and vulnerability.

The interrelationship between poverty and terrorism also functions in the opposite direction. AusAID notes:

Terrorism threatens poverty reduction and stability in our region. This in turn impacts on Australia’s security and prosperity. The aid program plays a significant role in broader efforts to counter terrorism, drawing on its own expertise and experience in building capacity and promoting environments for growth and poverty reduction in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is a conscious attempt to address the fact that poverty may act as a catalyst to security problems, and that all of the OECD members have, to a greater or lesser extent, taken on board this aspect of preventing terror. As Christian Aid notes:

From the start of the post–Cold War era, donors, especially the US, began to realise that targeting poverty could also deliver security benefits. In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office’s paper, *Enhancing US Security Through Foreign Aid*, noted: A brief survey of the world’s trouble spots show[ed] a fairly striking correlation between economic malaise on the one hand and domestic unrest and political instability on the other. If the United States can address those problems by using its foreign aid to help to create economic opportunities and invest in human capital, then the chance of conflict may be reduced.

This may lead to shifts in the geostrategic focus of aid to countries whose “instability” might pose a greater threat to Western interests than others, particularly where the West has interests in natural resources. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), while stressing that its priorities remain on the least developed countries, nevertheless suggests:
we will pay greater attention to countries that play a critical role in promoting regional stability—or instability. This will include poor countries, such as Angola, as well as Middle Income Countries, such as South Africa. We will work in some of these countries through our bilateral programmes. Elsewhere, we will work through multilateral agencies, including the European Union, which operate in a wider range of Middle Income Countries than DfID; for example, in the Middle East and North Africa.

Cosgrave notes that even in humanitarian aid, which was previously targeted on the basis of need, there has been a shift in emphases. He cites Kosovo as an example of a place where a disproportionate amount of aid was allocated to the situation compared to other equally difficult conflicts. Likewise, he notes:

Afghanistan and Iraq are both the targets of large amounts of Humanitarian Aid, but here the intention appears to be more about delivering a regime change dividend than about humanitarian assistance.

Woods notes that U.K. foreign policy and aid budgets have both shifted noticeably toward Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. He estimates that the U.K. military budget in Iraq has surpassed £2.5 billion, and that between financial years 2001–2002 and 2004–2005, expenditures on Iraq and Afghanistan would be in the region of £4.5 billion.

The DfID’s own direct contributions to Afghanistan have increased from £35 million in 2002–2003 to over £70 million in the following two years. Likewise DfID’s aid to Iraq in 2003–2004 increased to £207 million. Similar patterns of aid growth are notable in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Indonesia. Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan are now at the top of DfID’s bilateral recipients, which while not affecting low-income country aid levels, has led to reductions in spending to middle-income countries estimated at GBP100 million in 2004–2005 and 2005–2006. However, Woods notes that so far the financing for the War on Terror has largely emerged from outside traditional aid budgets.

**Homoeconomicus and Rational Choice Theories**

The third and final major approach reflects mainstream liberal ideas. Drawing on rational choice theories of human action, Collier and Hoeffler suggest that wars are driven less by justified grievances and far more by personal and collective greed. In this approach, humans engaged in conflict are viewed as economic agents seeking out profit. As a result, the route to peace and security is not through addressing inequality and structural exclusion, but through cutting off access to the resources of violent actors.

This approach has gained sympathy in the United States and with the World Bank. In practical terms this results in attempts to cut off financial networks and illicit activities that lead to the purchase of weapons. This framework treats security issues as crimes and seeks to increase the opportunity costs of engagement by cutting off funds and addressing “enemy” groups through military force. This strategy has less substantive educational content, although increased interest is placed on “good governance” involving, for example, training civil servants to prevent corruption.

As Picciotto notes, each of these theories sheds some light on an aspect of the security issue, however each misses out on other important aspects. Both Huntington and Collier
and Hoeffler avoid issues of poverty and inequality, while both Collier and Hoeffler and Duffield avoid issues of cultural conflict. In future policy, we may well see a combination of these different strategies emanating from the OECD countries.

Being able to identify these different theories of conflict enables us to understand that recent security concerns do not inevitably mean that the MDGs will be placed at risk. If donor nations take a more structural approach to security, this might lead to more policies aimed at addressing global inequality and poverty, albeit in selective geographical areas. The recent interest in Africa might well reflect the recognition of this. Cosgrave, however, is far more pessimistic, arguing that the poor are likely to lose out in the new security environment as funds go to countries and areas where security is the major issue. Woods see three key challenges for foreign aid:

None of these challenges is new, but each risks being magnified and exacerbated by the “war on terror” and the war in Iraq. The first concern is the goals of aid. Donors may hijack foreign aid to pursue their own security objectives rather than those which would help the poorest. The second concern is about money. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the wider war on terror have been extremely costly, and the debts incurred may soon gobble up aid budgets. The third concern is about the delivery of aid. Major donors are failing to coordinate aid through existing multilateral institutions, choosing instead to create their own new mechanisms and pursue their own priorities.

Aid and the New Security Environment

While the post–September 11 environment is very different from the security threats involved with the Cold War, we can learn from the uses that overseas aid were put to by the competing blocs.

Some writers argue that there is a close relationship between the volumes and direction of foreign aid and voting patterns within the United Nations during the Cold War era. Likewise, Cosgrave shows how patterns of overseas aid and ODA often mirrored the concerns of the major powers, a process that continues to date:

Forty years ago one eighth of all Aid went to India. Newly independent Algeria got 7% of all aid spending in 1962 at the end of the long war with France. The pattern of aid varies with different political developments over the years. In 1972, during the Vietnam War, Vietnam was the second largest recipient, and anti-communist Indonesia came next. Pakistan, the bulwark against al-Qaeda, and a battleground in the war on terror was the largest aid recipient in 2002.

Crucially, the geography of aid was based less on perceived humanitarian need and more on political alliances, which often led to a blind eye being turned to human rights violations. In the post–Cold War environment, two contradictory but related phenomena began to emerge. On the one hand, the end of the Cold War led to less politically motivated aid and a shift to channeling aid to those in least developed countries, grouped around a set of common goals (MDGs):
With the end of the Cold War, new criteria emerged. There was increasing concern about the lack of development in sub-Saharan Africa and concern about the impact this would have on developed countries. Flows of migrants from developing countries were already a very contentious issue in the west. Donors set international development goals at conferences throughout the nineties culminating in the Millennium Development Goals in September 2000.\textsuperscript{1}

Secondly, there was an overall decline in overseas aid, largely related to the lack of necessity for powerful nations to court less-developed countries. This downward pattern is reflected in decreased overall OECD/ODA contributions as a percentage of GNP (gross national product) between 1990 and 1997.\textsuperscript{2} However, after 2000 this began to change. Substantial increases in overall ODA were pledged in the March 2002 Financing for Development Conference by the United States and the EU.\textsuperscript{3} This was projected by the DAC to increase overall ODA to $75 billion in 2006, up from $52 billion in 2001. While not at the levels of the Cold War era, volumes of aid do appear to be increasing.

Despite the stagnation in ODA levels from 1990 to 2000, aid to education managed to slightly increase its percentage from 9.8 percent in 1990 to 11.2 percent in 1995. However, it began to steadily decline from 2000 onward. Basic education did manage to steadily increase its percentage of overall aid from 0.1 percent in 1993 to 2.2 percent in 2002. This is set to continue, with increased pledges to UPE (Universal Primary Education) from Canada, Nordic Countries, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and the United States.\textsuperscript{4} Nevertheless the new pledges still fall short of the estimated resources required for the achievement of the two educational targets by 2015.\textsuperscript{5}

It remains to be seen whether the new security realities and the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan may further reduce the possibilities of UPE and gender quality by 2015 and further reduce the possibilities of achieving the MDG goals. As Cosgrave notes:

\begin{quote}
In October 2003, the US pledged 20 billion dollars for reconstruction in Iraq. This amount is equal to one and a half times the USA’s annual development aid budget. Pledges by other donors were far smaller, but those like the UK, the European Commission, or Spain that have pledged an amount equivalent to 20\% of their annual development budget for Iraq will have to dig deep. This will have a cost for existing development programmes as most countries have drawn contributions for Afghanistan and Iraq from existing budgets.\textsuperscript{6}
\end{quote}

In order to explore these patterns in detail, we will now look more closely at the literature, which outlines the volume and direction of aid from the biggest donor: the United States, and one of the biggest recipients, Pakistan, to see what patterns might be emerging.

**The Case of the USA**

As Woods notes:

The United States is at present the largest provider of development aid. Already in 2002 it accounted for 23 per cent of global development aid, the top six recipients of which were Egypt, Russia, Israel, Pakistan, Serbia and
Colombia. Since 2002 US aid flows have almost tripled. Between 2002 and 2004 US aid rose from $12.9 billion to $33.2 billion, including $18.6 billion for Iraq in the 2004 supplemental budget. Is the increase in aid due to the new security imperatives? Most of the increase in US aid has been destined for projects designed to serve the security imperatives prevailing in the wake of September 11. Hence, almost all of the $2 billion supplemental in 2002, the $4 billion supplemental in 2003 and the $20.1 billion supplemental in 2004, plus roughly $2 billion annually in “budgeted” funds—a total of approximately $32 billion over the past three years—went to help countries on the front lines of Afghanistan, to build support for the war on Iraq or to fund the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{iii}

None of the top recipients appear on the least-developed country list, however they do represent countries of vital geostrategic and political importance for the United States. Absent from Woods analysis are the new budgeted resources for HIV/AIDS, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) which pledged $15 billion between 2003 and 2008 to combat HIV/AIDS in Africa and the Caribbean\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{iii} and the Millennium Challenge Account, which committed $1 billion in 2004, $1.5 billion in 2005, and requested $3 billion for financial year 2006 for aid focused on low-income countries.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{iv} These initiatives draw attention to the fact that while the United States may be acting increasingly unilaterally, it is not reducing its commitment to the MDGs. However, the United States’ new geostrategic priorities have facilitated the return of Pakistan into an alliance with the West.

The Case of Pakistan

The unprecedented attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 dramatically reoriented American policy interests in South Asia. Before the attacks, the George W. Bush administration had nearly relegated Pakistan to the category of a “rogue state” because of its coup against a democratically elected government, its support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, its involvement in terrorist insurgency in the Indian-controlled Kashmir, and its involvement in nuclear and ballistic missiles deals with China and North Korea. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration did a complete \textit{volte-face} in its dealings with Pakistan.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{v}

In the late 1990s, Pakistan had an uneasy relationship with the international community after first testing nuclear weapons (1998) and then being governed by General Musharraf after a military coup (1999). International aid flows decreased, with the United States cutting back aid by $40 million dollars in 1999 to leave total aid in 2000 at £88.5 million.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{vi} Likewise, the United Kingdom reduced aid from around $60 million dollars per year prior to the nuclear testing and the military coup to $23.7 million dollars in 2000.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{vii}

All this quickly changed after September 11, 2001 following Musharraf’s commitment to support the War on Terror. From that point on, significant aid has gone to Pakistan.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{viii} In 2002, U.S. aid increased from $88.5 million to $775 million dollars. The DfID’s aid to Pakistan increased from a low of £12 million in 2001 to £64 million in 2003–2004, with a further projected increase to £90 million by 2007–2008.\textsuperscript{b}\textsuperscript{x} All of these increases place
pressure on DfID’s commitment to spend 90% of its budget on the least developed countries.

**Politicization of Aid to Education**

Beyond trying to understand the shifting pattern in overall aid volumes, it is also important to understand the form and use of aid to education. There are clear dangers of following an aid policy based on the presumption that my enemy’s enemy is my friend. During the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan during the 1980s the United States, via Pakistan, channeled a great deal of resources to a range of armed mujahideen fighters that had been recruited from across the Islamic world and from Afghan refugee camps along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Education was not immune from these processes and USAID provided substantial grants to develop school textbooks to be used to promote antisoviet propaganda through recourse to radical Islam:

Special textbooks were published in Dari and Pashtu, designed by the Centre for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska-Omaha under a USAID grant in the early 1980s. Written by American Afghanistan experts and anti-Soviet Afghan educators, they aimed at promoting jihadi values and militant training among Afghans. USAID paid the University of Nebraska U.S.$51 million from 1984 to 1994 to develop and design these textbooks, which were mostly printed in Pakistan. Over 13 million were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and Pakistani madrasas “where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles.”

Craig, in findings from doctoral research on primary education in Afghanistan, found that during the 1980s textbooks promoting violence were produced and widely distributed thanks to the USAID grants. In the following example he shows a math textbook for 4th grade children that asks the following question:

The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3,200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead.

During this same period there was a general reduction in funding for state schools due to fiscal crisis and an increase in religious boarding schools known as madrasas in Pakistan. It is these same madrasas that have now become the focus of the United States as alleged promoters of Islamic violence:

The only way to end the culture of violence we now face is to undermine the institutions that sustain it. Radical groups require radical schools. A nuanced approach can be mounted towards the challenges that stem from militant Madrassahs.

USAID has responded to this by increasing funding to state school education in both Pakistan and Indonesia, and recently invested large amounts of funding in the education sector.

USAID’s strategy is to deny recruits from terrorist organizations by offering better alternatives: basic education vs. radical madrasas, skills training vs. unemployment, and the development of micro-enterprise generated jobs vs.
terrorism out of a sense of hopelessness and desperation. USAID targets areas where terrorist recruiting conditions are the strongest: large Muslim communities, relatively poor communities, areas characterized by high youth unemployment, and where there are large pockets of disaffected groups.\textsuperscript{1xxv}

An earlier USAID report notes that:

The United States has been short-sighted in leaving countries or abandoning the social and educational sectors. This lack of vision creates a vacuum in which extremism may flourish. NGO activity, no matter how useful and energetic, cannot substitute for state capacity. That is why taking control of the education ministry often forms a vital part of the agenda of any fanatical creed when it wins power. However, education with a strong secular bias (though by no means anti-religious), open to both sexes, offers one of the most effective ways to delegitimise terrorism.\textsuperscript{1xxvi}

The report continues:

In this new era, many “old” development strategies may find new life in the context of economic assistance aimed at combating terrorism over the longer term. For example, vocational training and craft apprenticeship put idle hands to work; job creation will help drain the pool of potential recruits to terrorist organizations.\textsuperscript{1xxvii}

The cases of Pakistan and Afghanistan shows how the United States is now following an educational policy that seeks to address both the structural inequality caused by poverty and the cultural hostility to the West, partly spurned by their own earlier policies of neoliberal structural reform and anti-Soviet propaganda. Overall, the example of U.S. Cold War policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan show the potential policy outcomes and unintended consequences of intentional action in the field of aid to education.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter we have argued that there is a shift in aid policy as a result of changes in the wider security environment. Furthermore, the different theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between security and development demonstrate that the consequences of these shifts can be diverse. There is also considerable concern that the negative impacts of economic globalization might either contribute to or exacerbate conflict and security, while at the same time undermining global commitments to the Millennium Development Goals and the nature of aid to the poorest countries in the world, including education aid. Although the evidence is fragmentary, partial, and selective, there nevertheless appear to be clear warnings that the more consolidatory approach that developed during the 1990s toward international development policy may be under threat from the new security focus of the post–September 11 period.

On the other hand, in both Washington and London opposition to the militarized strategy of the Western alliance continues to grow, both inside and outside government, and there is some evidence that the respective administrations appear to be belatedly recognizing that the military strategy is failing to deliver expected policy results and that a more consolidated approach might be necessary. Strengthening education systems in marginalized countries, improving the volume and quality of international aid, and
addressing global inequalities may yet reemerge as far better policy interventions than the overwhelming violence that has characterized the overall policy response of the United States and the United Kingdom since 9/11, which has created such deadly consequences. Let us hope so, for all our sakes.

Endnotes

ii Woods, “Shifting Politics.”


x Christian Aid, Politics of Poverty, 1.


xv Christian Aid, Politics of Poverty, 14.


xvii See Picciotto, “Memorandum,” 1.


xix Christian Aid, Politics of Poverty.


xxi See Picciotto, “Memorandum,”.


xxiv Huntington, Clash of Civilizations.


GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy.

GAO, U.S. Public Diplomacy, 1.

Duffield, Global Governance.

Duffield, Global Governance.


AusAID, Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid (Canberra: AusAID, Australian Government, 2003).

AusAID, Counter-Terrorism, 4.

AusAID, Counter-Terrorism, 11.

Christian Aid, Politics of Poverty, 11.

See DfID, Fighting Poverty, 23.


Cosgrave, “The Impact of the War on Terror,” 7.


Christian Aid, Politics of Poverty.

Woods, “Shifting Politics.”


See Picciotto, “Memorandum.”

See Cosgrave, “The Impact of the War on Terror.”


Mundy, Education for All, 18–19.


See Cosgrave, “The Impact of the War on Terror,” 2.


Christian Aid, *Politics of Poverty*.

Christian Aid, *Politics of Poverty*.

See Picciotto “Memorandum.”


This point is well made by A. Coulson, “Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World: Is There a Problem? What Can We Do About It?” *Policy Analysis* 5 no. 11 (2004).


See USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development), 10.


Clad, *USAID’s Role*, 4.