Accounting and Finance Seminars- David Veenman (Amsterdam)
G.15, 15-19 Tyndalls Park Road
Title - Does CEO Inside Debt Ownership A ffect Financial Reporting Quality
This study presents a reexamination of the relation between CEO ownership of inside debt" (i.e., dened benet pensions and deferred compensation) and the quality of firms' financial reporting. While recent research finds that CEO inside debt ownership is associated with higher quality nancial reporting, as indicated by proxies for aggressive financial reporting, we argue there are both conceptual and empirical reasons to suggest this relation is not as clear-cut as prior research concludes. Using several proxies for aggressive nancial reporting, we do not nd robust evidence suggesting that CEO inside debt ownership is associated with higher quality nancial reporting. This study contributes to the literature on the incentive eects of managerial inside debt ownership, as well as the broader literature by responding to recent calls for replication in accounting research and by illustrating the importance of documenting "null" results. In addition, we highlight the importance of transparency in research about simple, yet in uential, design choices.