Professor In-Uck Park

Professor In-Uck Park

Professor In-Uck Park
Leverhulme Professor of Industrial Organisation

The Priory Road Complex, Priory Road, Clifton
(See a map)

Telephone Number (0117) 928 8421

Department of Economics


In-Uck Park's main research interests are in the areas of contract theory; industrial organisation (theoretical approach); game theory and information. He is currently working on: reputation and trust in market environments; glass ceiling as a competitive outcome of labor market; startups and Intellectual Property; and competing networks.


ECONM1010: MSc Microeconomics
ECONM3024: MSc Advanced Microeconomics

Fields of interest

Contract Theory, Industrial Organisation, Game Theory,

Latest publications

  1. Panagopoulos, A & Park, I-U, 2017, ‘Patents as Negotiating Assets: Patenting Versus Secrecy for Startups’. Economic Journal.
  2. McLennan, A & Park, I-U, 2016, ‘The market for liars: Reputation and auditor honesty’. International Journal of Economic Theory , vol 12., pp. 49?66
  3. Morelli, M & Park, I-U, 2016, ‘Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures’. Games and Economic Behavior, vol 96., pp. 90-96
  4. Jullien, B & Park, I-U, 2014, ‘New, Like New, or Very Good? Reputation and Credibility’. Review of Economic Studies, vol 81., pp. 1543-1574
  5. Park, I-U, Peacey, MW & Munafò, MR, 2013, ‘Modelling the effects of subjective and objective decision making in scientific peer review’. Nature.
  6. Choe, C & Park, I-U, 2011, ‘Information, Authority, and Corporate Hierarchies’. BE Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol 11.
  7. Jun, BH & Park, I-U, 2010, ‘Anti-Limit Pricing’. Hitotsubashi Journal of Economics, vol 51., pp. 57 - 78
  8. Ochs, J & Park, I-U, 2010, ‘Overcoming the Co-ordination Problem:Dynamic Formation of Networks’. Journal of Economic Theory, vol 145., pp. 689 - 720
  9. Grout, P, Park, I-U & Sonderegger, S, 2007, ‘An Economic Theory of the Glass Ceiling’.
  10. Park, I-U, 2005, ‘Cheap-Talk Referrals of Differentiated Experts in Repeated Relationships’. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 36 (2)., pp. 391 - 411
  11. Grout, P & Park, I-U, 2005, ‘Competitive planned obsolescence’. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 36 (3)., pp. 596 - 612
  12. Grout, P & Park, I-U, 2004, ‘Promoting competition in the presence of essential facilities’. International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol 22 (10)., pp. 1415 - 1441
  13. Park, I-U, 2004, ‘Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets’. Econometrica, vol 72 (3)., pp. 701 - 746
  14. Park, I-U, 2004, ‘A Simple Inducement Scheme to Overcome Adoption Externalities’. Contributions to Theoretical Economics, vol 4 (1)., pp. 1 - 24
  15. Kim, J & Park, I-U, 2002, ‘The Stock Market Condition and Initial Public Offering Pricing: A Theory and Evidence from the KOSDAQ Stock Market’. Korean Economic Review, vol 18., pp. 349 - 371
  16. Park, I-U, 2002, ‘Cheap Talk Coordination of Entry by Privately Informed Firms’. RAND Journal of Economics, vol 33 (3)., pp. 377 - 393
  17. Park, I-U & McLennan, A, 1999, ‘Generic 4x4 Two Person Games Have at Most 15 Nash Equilibria’. Games and Economic Behavior, vol 26., pp. 111 - 130
  18. Park, I-U, 1999, ‘Competitive planned obsolescence’. Discussion Paper 474, submitted to Rand Journal of Econ, vol 99/4 74.
  19. Park, I-U, 1999, ‘Sequential cheap talk and coordination of entry by privately informed firms’. Submitted to Rand Journal of Economics.
  20. Park, I-U, 1999, ‘Cheap talk reputation and coordination of different experts’. Submitted to Review of Economics Studies.
  21. Park, I-U, 1998, ‘A revealed-perference implication of weight utility decisions under uncertain’. Economic Theory, vol 11., pp. 413 - 426
  22. Park, I-U, 1998, ‘Repeated moral hazard with renegotiation and free access to credit markets’. Working Paper (Discussion Paper 450).
  23. Park, I-U, 1997, ‘Generic finiteness of equilbrium outcome distributions for sender-receiver games’. Journal of Economic Theory, vol 76., pp. 431 - 448
  24. Park, I-U, 1997, ‘Using access pricing of essential facilities to promote Effective Competition’.
  25. Green, E & Park, I-U, 1996, ‘Bayes contingent plans’. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, vol 31., pp. 225 - 236
  26. Mclennan, A & Park, I-U, 1996, ‘Generic 4x4 two person games have at most 15 equilibria’. Unknown Publisher
  27. Green, E & Park, I-U, 1995, ‘Bayes Contingent Plans’. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
  28. Park, I-U, 1994, ‘A Revealed-Preference Implication of Weighted Utility Decisions under Uncertainty’. University of Bristol
  29. Park, I-U, 1993, ‘Three Essays in Game Theory’. University of Minnesota, PhD Thesis.
  30. Park, I-U, 1993, ‘Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-talk Games’. University of Bristol

Full publications list in the University of Bristol publications system

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