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Publication - Professor In-Uck Park

    Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures

    Citation

    Morelli, M & Park, I-U, 2016, ‘Internal Hierarchy and Stable Coalition Structures’. Games and Economic Behavior, vol 96., pp. 90-96

    Abstract

    In deciding whether to join a coalition or not, an agent must consider both i) the expected power of the coalition and ii) her position in the vertical structure within the coalition. We establish the existence of a positive relationship between the degree of inequality in remuneration within coalitions and the number of coalitions to be formed endogenously in stable systems. We show that such coalitions can be mixed and balanced, rather than segregated, in terms of members' ability levels. In any stable system each coalition is of an efficient size and every agent is paid her marginal contribution.

    Full details in the University publications repository