% This file was created with JabRef 2.3.1. % Encoding: MacRoman @INCOLLECTION{Mischler1999, author = {Brent D. Mischler}, title = {Getting Rid of Species?}, crossref = {Wilson1999}, keywords = {Species, Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Abbott1997, author = {Abbott, Barbara}, title = {A Note on the Nature of "Water"}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1997}, volume = {106}, pages = {311--319}, number = {422}, month = {apr}, abstract = {In his essay on the study of language Chomsky (1995) notes that substances such as tea and Sprite, though they (are believed to) contain roughly the same proportion of H2O molecules as tap water, are nevertheless not called water. In so doing he wantes to challenge the essentialist semantics of Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1975), according to which reference for works like "water" is determined by internal structural properties, and suggests instead that "special human interests and concerns" (p. 22) play a role in categorization in this case no less than in the case of artifact terms. Coincidentally, in a paper titled "Water is not H2O" Malt (1994) has argued along very similiar lines. Both Chomsky and Malt echo concerns expressed by Wilson (1982, p. 578). However, while Wilson (1982) generally supported Putnam' psychologically externalist semantics, and Malt remains neutral on the issue, Chomsky's remarks are part of an extended plea for psychological internalism. In this paper I want to reassert the claim that water is H2O, and respond in a way that is consistent with that fact to Chomsky's observations. This requires explaining why substances which are largely H2O may be called something else and explaining why what we call water does not have to be pure H2O. But first I want to clarify the extent to which the conclusions of Putnam (1975) have been challenged.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28199704%292%3A106%3A422%3C311%3AANOTNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2} } @ARTICLE{Andreasen2000, author = {Andreasen, Robin O.}, title = {Race: Biological Reality or Social Construct?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {S653--S666}, month = {sep}, abstract = {Race was once thought to be a real biological kind. Today the dominant view is that objective biological races don't exist. I challenge the trend to reject the biological reality of race by arguing that cladism (a school of classification that individuates taxa by appeal to common ancestry) provides a new way to define race biologically. I also reconcile the proposed biological conception with constructivist theories about race. Most constructivists assume that biological realism and social constructivism are incompatible views about race; I argue that the two conceptions can be compatible.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28200009%2967%3CS653%3ARBROSC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8} } @ARTICLE{Armstrong1999, author = {Armstrong, David}, title = {The Causal Theory of Properties: Properties according to Shoemaker, Ellis and Others}, journal = {Philosophical Topics}, year = {1999}, volume = {26}, pages = {25--37} } @BOOK{Armstrong1997, title = {A World of States of Affairs}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Armstrong, David}, url = {http://www.amazon.com/States-Affairs-Cambridge-Studies-Philosophy/dp/0521589487} } @BOOK{Armstrong1978, title = {Universals and Scientific Realism}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1978}, author = {Armstrong, David}, url = {http://www.amazon.com/Nominalism-Realism-Universals-Scientific/dp/0521280338} } @ARTICLE{Baillie1990, author = {Baillie, James}, title = {Identity, Survival, and Sortal Concepts}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1990}, volume = {40}, pages = {183--194}, number = {159}, month = {apr}, abstract = {In cases of purported identity through time for natural kinds, the orthodox viewpoint is that there must be a principle whereby a and b can be located in a single continuous spatio-temporal path and thereby, be identified as stages of some continuant particular. In addition, it is assumed that the identification of a and b must be 'sortal-covered' i.e. they must be identified not just as stages of the same thing, but of the same f where f is the appropriate natural kind concept. It is assumed then that a particular cannot change from being a member of one natural kind to being a member of another, without contravening the conditions under which identity holds. This article challenges each of these claims.}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28199004%2940%3A159%3C183%3AISASC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4} } @ARTICLE{Bealer1987, author = {Bealer, George}, title = {The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1987}, volume = {1}, pages = {289--365}, abstract = {Bealer argues that the most of the central questions of philosophy are category and content concepts. Local scientific essentialism is committed to a limited rationalist theory of the determinate possession of these concepts. But this rationalist theory implies that, if a proposition involving exclusively category and content concepts can be known to be necessary, then in principle it can be known to be necessary absolutely a priori, without the aid of empirical science. Therefore, glocal scientific essentialism is untenable. Local scientific essentialism implies the autonomy of philosophy.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583%281987%291%3C289%3ATPLOSE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z} } @ARTICLE{Bennett1969, author = {Bennett, Daniel}, title = {Essential Properties}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1969}, volume = {66}, pages = {487--499}, number = {15}, month = {aug}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819690807%2966%3A15%3C487%3AEP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M} } @ARTICLE{Bigelow1992, author = {Bigelow, John and Ellis, Brian and Lierse, Caroline}, title = {The World as One of a Kind: Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, volume = {43}, pages = {371--388}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {Some philosophers have maintained that there are many worlds which are spatially, temporally and causally unrelated to ours. We are not asserting that there are any such disconnected worlds. Nor do we assert that there are none. The paper claim that there is at least one world and it is a member of a natural kind, whether or not there are any others of its kind. Recognition that the world is one of a kind offers a new approach to the question of what a law of nature is.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28199209%2943%3A3%3C371%3ATWAOOA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7} } @INBOOK{Bird1998, chapter = {Natural Kinds}, pages = {95--120}, title = {Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, editor = {John Shand}, author = {Bird, Alexander}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=czUjWnpAnUQC&pg=PP10&lpg=PP10&dq=bird+philosophy+of+science&source=web&ots=sXV6sX2QST&sig=GFtXRAKRS2uzrYw1rW_LPBlIbKM&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPP1,M1} } @ARTICLE{Bird2008, author = {Bird, Alexander}, title = {Lowe on a Posteriori Essentialism}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2008}, volume = {68}, pages = {336--44}, abstract = {A posteriori knowledge of necessity may be held to be a consequence of the combination of a priori knowledge of a proposition asserting essence or necessity with a posteriori knowledge of a non-modal proposition. E.J. Lowe (2007) denies even this kind of derived a posteriori knowledge of essence or necessity. Lowe's objections, if well-founded, would provide a powerful check on claims on behalf of a posteriori knowledge of essence and necessity. Bird argues that Lowe's objections can be resisted.}, url = {http://eis.bris.ac.uk/~plajb/research/papers/Lowe_A_Posteriori_Essentialism.pdf} } @BOOK{Bird2007, title = {Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and Properties}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2007}, author = {Bird, Alexander}, url = {http://www.oup.com/uk/catalogue/?ci=9780199227013#contents} } @ARTICLE{birdtobin2008, author = {Bird, Alexander and Tobin, Emma}, title = {Natural Kinds}, journal = {Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, year = {2008}, month = {Sept}, url = {http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-kinds/} } @INCOLLECTION{Boer1985, author = {Steven Boer}, title = {Substance and Kind: Reflections on the New Theory of Reference}, booktitle = {Analytical Philosophy in Comparative Perspective}, publisher = {D. Reidel}, year = {1985}, editor = {B. K. Matilal and J. L. Shaw}, pages = {103-50}, address = {Dordrecht}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @INCOLLECTION{Boyd1999a, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Homeostasis, Species and Higher Taxa}, booktitle = {Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1999}, editor = {R. Wilson} } @ARTICLE{Boyd1999b, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {95}, pages = {67--98}, abstract = {Boyd comments on Millikan's (1999) "Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences".}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/x013775213644141/} } @ARTICLE{Boyd1991, author = {Boyd, Richard}, title = {Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {61}, pages = {127-48}, abstract = {Boyd defend an enthuasiasm for natural kinds against Hacking's (1991) challenge. Boyd concedes that there are important philosophical and methodological differences between kinds defined by property clusters and kinds defined by sets of properties, and between natural properties and social properties. He argues nevertheless, that there are extremely good reasons for treating many property-cluster kinds and social kinds and the terms that refer to them as homeostatic property clusters.}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/j4654u41040w3651/?p=8feaba4207ab44bf9c7b5a2aeb471fffandpi=1} } @ARTICLE{Brody1973, author = {Brody, Baruch A.}, title = {Why Settle for Anything Less than Good Old-Fashioned Aristotelian Essentialism}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1973}, volume = {7}, pages = {351--365}, number = {4}, month = {nov}, abstract = {I should like in this paper to explain and defend a theory of essentialism that I have briefly set out elsewhere. In paricular, I would like to show that (a) it is based upon a simple distinction that we can often employ without difficulty and (b) it is open to none of the standard objections to essentialism and (c) it recognizes as essential significant properties of particular physical objects, most importantly, the ones that correspond to the intuitively appropriate Aristotelian secondary substances. If all of this can be done, then will be no reason to offer, as recent defenders of essentialism like Kaplan and Plantiga have, some de dicto reinterpretaion of essentialist claims. This is fortunate, for the theory in question does not seem to lend itself to such reinterpretations. In short, then, I will be arging for an unabashed traditional theory of Aristotelian essentialism.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28197311%297%3A4%3C351%3AWSFALT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B} } @ARTICLE{Brody1967, author = {Brody, B. A.}, title = {Natural Kinds and Real Essences}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1967}, volume = {64}, pages = {431--446}, number = {14}, month = {jul}, abstract = {Brody argues, contrary to what is usually thought about these matters, that the worst problem for the theory of identity has to do with its spatiotemporal aspect, and not with anything connected with natural kinds and essences.}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819670720%2964%3A14%3C431%3ANKARE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E} } @ARTICLE{Chapman1973, author = {Chapman, Tobias}, title = {Identity and Reference}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1973}, volume = {82}, pages = {542--556}, number = {328}, month = {oct}, abstract = {This paper attempts to spell out the assumptions about meaning and reference that Wiggins (1967) and Perry (1970) seem to be operating on in dissolving apparent counter-examples to the thesis of "strict identity". The author questions these asssumptions and concludes that the thesis of the relativity of identity may be correct.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28197310%292%3A82%3A328%3C542%3AIAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P} } @ARTICLE{Churchland1981, author = {Churchland, Paul M.}, title = {Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1981}, volume = {78}, pages = {67--90}, number = {2}, month = {feb}, abstract = {Eliminative materialism is the thesis that our common-sense conception of psychological phenomena consitutess a radically false theory, a theory so fundamentally defective that both the principles and the ontology of that theory will eventually be displaces, rather than smoothly reduced, by completed neuroscience. Churchland explores these projections, especially as they bear on (1) the principle elements of common-sense psychology: the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires etc.) and (2) the conception of rationality in which these elements figure.}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28198102%2978%3A2%3C67%3AEMATPA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8} } @ARTICLE{Coleman2001, author = {Coleman, Keith A. and Wiley, E.O.}, title = {On Species Individualism: A New Defense of the Species-as-Individuals Hypothesis}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, volume = {68}, pages = {498--517}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {We attempt to defend the species-as-individuals hypothesis by examining the logical role played by the binomials (e.g., "Homo sapiens, ""Pinus ponderosa") in biological discourse about species. Those who contend that the binomials can be properly understood as functioning in biological theory as singular terms opt for an objectual account of species and view species as individuals. Those who contend that the binomials can in principle be eliminated from biological theory in favor of predicate expressions opt for a predicative account of species and view species as kinds. We contend that biologists'talk about species is talk about species as individuals, and we conclude that the most plausible account of species is an objectual account.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28200112%2968%3A4%3C498%3AOSIAND%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B} } @INCOLLECTION{Collier1996, author = {John Collier}, title = {On the Necessity of Natural Kinds}, booktitle = {Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1996}, editor = {P. Riggs}, pages = {1-10}, address = {Dordrecht}, abstract = {In this essay, Collier investigages why natural kinds are used in science and the extent to which science requires them. These issues revolve around the role of nomological necessity in science and the role of natural kinds in natural laws. Collier gives an account of natural necessity and the necessary (essential) properties of natural kinds that distinguishes the necessity involved from analyticity, logical necessity and metaphysical necessity. The distinction is based on a metaphysical difference between propositions that must be true and propositions that cannot be false.}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&id=0DZEyLWqrZcC&dq=On+the+Necessity+of+Natural+Kinds&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=PLN5VdftLk&sig=FAG6PoC1KvQmV7goBxffEuj1kVU&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA1,M1} } @ARTICLE{Cooper2004, author = {Cooper, Rachel}, title = {Why Hacking is wrong about Human Kinds}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, volume = {55}, pages = {73-85}, number = {1}, abstract = {Human kind is a term introduced by Ian Hacking to refer to the kinds of people child abusers, pregnant teenagers, the unemployed studied by the human sciences. Hacking argues that classifying and describing human kinds results in feedback, which alters the very kinds under study. This feedback results in human kinds having histories totally unlike those of natural kinds (such as gold, electrons and tigers), leading Hacking to conclude that human kinds are radically unlike natural kinds. Here I argue that Hacking's argument fails and that he has not demonstrated that human kinds cannot be natural kinds.}, url = {http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/55/1/73} } @INCOLLECTION{Daly1998, author = {Chris Daly}, title = {Natural Kinds}, booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, editor = {Edward Craig}, volume = {6}, pages = {68--125}, address = {London}, url = {http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/N099?ssid=881080770&n=1#} } @ARTICLE{Daly1996a, author = {Daly, Chris}, title = {Defending Promiscuous Realism About Natural Kinds}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1996}, volume = {46}, pages = {496--500}, number = {185}, month = {oct}, abstract = {Wilkerson (1993) argues against Dupr\'{e}'s promiscuous realism. Daly meets Wilkerson's two objections to Dupr\'{e}.}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28199610%2946%3A185%3C496%3ADPRANK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6} } @ARTICLE{David1997, author = {David, Marian}, title = {Kim's Functionalism}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1997}, volume = {31}, pages = {133--148}, abstract = {This paper discusses Kim's functionalism and contends it on two grounds. First, some functionalist will object to being classified as reductionists. Second, Kim argues for a version of functionalism, conceptualized functionalism, that makes it rather similiar to the "old" mind-body identity theory it was designed to replace. Moreover, Kim's functionalism turns out to be a somewhat surprisong brand of reductionisms. At the end of the paper, David proposes a construal of the more standard version of functionalism that obviates Kim's argument for switching-over to the conceptualized version.}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%281997%2931%3C133%3AKF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8} } @BOOK{Dupre2002, title = {Humans and Other Animals}, publisher = {Clarendon Press}, year = {2002}, author = {Dupr\'{e}, John}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_a9zDR6oDTYC&dq=humans+and+other+animals+dupre&pg=PP1&ots=FpWRtBtXLW&sig=HOx4sxoANdFG9CGsMh2YPuVFeqE&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result} } @ARTICLE{Dupr'e2001, author = {John Dupr\'{e}}, title = {In Defence of Classification}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, volume = {32}, pages = {203--19}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_a9zDR6oDTYC&pg=PA81&dq=in+defence+of+classification+dupre&ei=BXa5SLScG4LgywT1xfyIBg&sig=ACfU3U2jkOsQ-lR_FCQ0BMfrrkTbJa4jBg} } @ARTICLE{Dupre1996, author = {John Dupr\'{e}}, title = {Promiscuous Realism: Reply to Wilson}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1996}, volume = {47}, pages = {441--444}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {This paper presents a brief response to Robert A. Wilson's critical discussion of Promiscuous Realism [1996]. I argue that, although convergence on a unique conception of species cannot be ruled out, the evidence against such an outcome is stronger than Wilson allows. In addition, given the failure of biological science to come up with a unique and privileged set of biological kinds, the relevance of the various overlapping kinds of ordinary language to the metaphysics of biological kinds is greater than Wilson admits.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28199609%2947%3A3%3C441%3APRRTW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-9} } @BOOK{Dupr'e1993, title = {The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {John Dupr\'{e}}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=EyrNAAAACAAJ&dq=the+disorder+of+things&ei=dnS5SOfEKIyuyAT715i3Bw&rview=1} } @ARTICLE{Dupre1983, author = {John Dupr\'{e}}, title = {The Disunity of Science}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1983}, volume = {92}, pages = {321--346}, number = {367}, month = {jul}, abstract = {Dupr\{e} argues against reductionism and the unity of science.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28198307%292%3A92%3A367%3C321%3ATDOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3} } @ARTICLE{Dupr'e1981, author = {John Dupr\'{e}}, title = {Natural kinds and biological taxa}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {1981}, volume = {90 (1)}, pages = {66--90}, abstract = {The main topic of this paper is the theory of natural kinds that been developed by Putnam and Kripke. One area in which this analysis has seemed particularly appropriate is that of general terms naming biological organisms. Dupr\{e}'s strategy is to compare the requirements of this analysis with some actual biological facts and theories. It will appear that these diverge to an extent which, he claims is fatal to the theory. In the end, Dupr\{e} also makes some constructive remarks about the nature of biological classification.}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=_a9zDR6oDTYC&pg=PA19&lpg=PA19&dq=natural+kinds+and+biological+taxa&source=web&ots=FpWRtBt-MT&sig=WmiaJXS6Jfz2Pr6j_c4qbR1AidQ&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result} } @ARTICLE{Earley1995, author = {Earley, Joseph E.}, title = {Why There is No Salt in the Sea}, journal = {Foundations of Chemistry}, year = {1995}, volume = {7}, pages = {85--102}, number = {1}, abstract = {What, precisely, is`salt'?It is a certain white, solid, crystalline, material, also called sodium chloride. Does any of that solid white stuff exist in the sea?–Clearly not. One can make salt from sea water easily enough, but that fact does not establish that salt, as such, is present in brine. (Paper and ink can be made into a novel–but no novel actually exists in a stack of blank paper with a vial of ink close by.) When salt dissolves in water, what is present is no longer`salt'but rather a collection of hydrated sodium cations and chloride anions, neither of which is precisely salt, nor is the collection. The aqueous material in brine is also significantly different from pure water. Salt may be considered to be present in seawater, but only in a more or less vague`potential'way. Actually, there is no salt in the sea. In both ancient and modern treatments of other important chemical concepts, including the notions of`element', related complication, especially polysemy (terms with multiple meanings), also occurs.In a recent paper, Paul Needham discussed the (predicable) properties of chemical substances, phases, and solutions. He provided a valuable characterization of cases in which several quantities occupy the same space. He also concluded that solution properties are not`intensive', because solvent and solute do not have parts in common. He tacitly assumed that ingredients are not altered by their inclusion in a solution. This may be the case in some special cases (deutero-benzene dissolved in benzene, say) but is not true in general–and certainly does not apply to the case of brine, which Needham used as an example–since the ions that exist in the solution, and also the aqueous material there, are quite different from the pure ingredients used in making the solution. An adequate theory of wholes and parts (mereology) must take into account that when individuals enter combinations of interesting sorts they no longer are the very same individuals that existed prior to the composition. It appears that no such formal theory now actually exists.}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/plk9558571216l44/} } @ARTICLE{Elder1995, author = {Elder, C.L.}, title = {A Different Kind of Natural Kind}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {73}, pages = {516-31}, abstract = {Natural kinds are groupings over which we can run inductions with nonaccidental success. But"why"are the members reliably the same?On the traditional conception of natural kinds, members share a distinctive microstructure which, thanks to the laws of nature, grounds further commonalities. But we seem reliably to run inductions over many groupings, for membership in which microstructure is neither necessary nor sufficient (e.g., traits of species). This paper advances a supplementary conception of natural kinds. The members are copied from previous members under selective pressure, and the environment which does the selecting is responsible for the commonalities.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/routledg/ajphil/1995/00000073/00000004/art00001} } @ARTICLE{Elder1994, author = {Elder, C.L.}, title = {Higher and Lower Level Essential Properties}, journal = {American Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1994}, volume = {31}, pages = {255--265} } @ARTICLE{Elder1998, author = {Elder, Crawford L.}, title = {What versus How in Naturally Selected Representations}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1998}, volume = {107}, pages = {349--363}, number = {426}, month = {apr}, abstract = {Empty judgements appear to be about something, and inaccurate judgements to report something. Naturalism tries to explain these appearances without positing non-real objects or states of affairs. Biological naturalism explains that the false and the empty are tokens which fail to perform the function proper to their biological type. But if truth is a biological"supposed to", we should expect designs that achieve it only often enough. The sensory stimuli which trigger the frog's gulp-launching signal may be a poor guide to the signal's content. Teleosemantics should be anti-verificationist.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28199804%292%3A107%3A426%3C349%3AWVHINS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z} } @ARTICLE{Elder1998a, author = {Elder, Crawford L.}, title = {Essential Properties and Coinciding Objects}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {317--331}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, abstract = {How can a parcel of matter, or collection of particles, simultaneously compose three different objects, characterized by different modal properties?If the statue is gouged it still exists, but not exactly that piece of gold which originally occupied the statue's borders, and the (mass of) gold within that piece can survive dispersal, while the piece cannot. The solution to this"problem of coinciding objects", this paper argues, is that there is, in that space, only the statue. The properties which the piece and the mass supposedly must have, to go on being, are not properties which anything can have necessarily or essentially. Not even having that origin can be essential. There is no object of which the statue is composed, though there are objects (viz., gold atoms) and a kind of stuff (viz., gold) of which it is composed.}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28199806%2958%3A2%3C317%3AEPACO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J} } @ARTICLE{Elder1996, author = {Elder, Crawford L.}, title = {Realism and Determinable Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1996}, volume = {56}, pages = {149--159}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {This paper challenges the prevailing arguments against determinable properties and argues that the ontology which they entail is decidely less austere than is commonly supposed. A side benefit is an increased appreciation for the treatment of vague predicates that posit truth-value gaps- and with it increased ease with the idea that corresponding to (at least some) vague predicates ther really are, in the world vague properties.}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28199603%2956%3A1%3C149%3ARADP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Z} } @ARTICLE{Elder1995a, author = {Crawford L. Elder}, title = {A Different Kind of Natural Kind}, journal = {Austalasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {73 (4)}, pages = {516--29}, abstract = {On one conception of natural kinds, the members of a natural kind are pruned into sameness by the environment which grew and sustains them. The aim of this paper is to explore this conception of natural kinds.}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a739203133~db=all~order=page} } @ARTICLE{Elder1989, author = {Elder, Crawford L.}, title = {Realism, Naturalism, and Culturally Generated Kinds}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1989}, volume = {39}, pages = {425--444}, number = {157}, month = {oct}, abstract = {This paper address a puzzle: what realists who are also naturalists should say about culturally generated kinds. Elder concludes that realists can be naturalists.}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28198910%2939%3A157%3C425%3ARNACGK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0} } @INCOLLECTION{Ellis2006, author = {Ellis, B}, title = {Physical Realism}, booktitle = {Metaphysics in Science}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2006}, pages = {1--13} } @BOOK{Ellis2002, title = {The Philosophy of Nature}, publisher = {Acumen}, year = {2002}, author = {Ellis, B.}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=hc8Y9-sNgGEC&dq=The+Philosophy+of+Nature+ellis&ei=S3m5SO6PFoyuyAT715i3Bw} } @BOOK{Ellis2001, title = {Scientific Essentialism}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Ellis, B.}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&id=SpBLHjH8Vv8C&dq=scientific+essentialism+ellis&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=LyahO4bc4F&sig=D2XU6zShjex2hdoDb7mu3FkotSc&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result} } @INCOLLECTION{Ellis1996, author = {Ellis, B.}, title = {Natural Kinds and Natural Kind Reasoning}, booktitle = {Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology}, publisher = {Kluwer}, year = {1996}, url = {http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&id=0DZEyLWqrZcC&dq=Natural+Kinds+and+Natural+Kind+Reasoning+ellis&printsec=frontcover&source=web&ots=PLN5VdiBSh&sig=MzTKNssjsvyM_2xWjIhmhV2MkEc&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=1&ct=result#PPA11,M1} } @INCOLLECTION{Ellis1994, author = {Ellis, B.}, title = {The Fundamental Importance of Natural Kinds}, booktitle = {Victorian Centre for the Philosophy of Science Preprint Series}, publisher = {La Trobe University}, year = {1994}, volume = {3/94} } @ARTICLE{Ellis1994a, author = {Ellis, B and Lierse C.E.}, title = {Dispositional Essentialism}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1994}, volume = {72}, pages = {27--45} } @BOOK{Ereshefsky2001, title = {The Poverty of the Linnaean Hierarchy: A Philosophical Study of Biological Taxonimy}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2001}, author = {Marc Ereshefsky}, address = {Cambridge}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Ereshefsky1998, author = {Ereshefsky, Marc}, title = {Species Pluralism and Anti-Realism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1998}, volume = {65}, pages = {103--120}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {Species pluralism gives us reason to doubt the existence of the species category. The problem is not that species concepts are chosen according to our interests or that pluralism and the desire for hierarchical classifications are incompatible. The problem is that the various taxa we call'species'lack a common unifying feature.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199803%2965%3A1%3C103%3ASPAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W} } @ARTICLE{Ereshefsky1991, author = {Ereshefsky, Marc}, title = {Species, Higher Taxa, and the Units of Evolution}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1991}, volume = {58}, pages = {84--101}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199103%2958%3A1%3C84%3ASHTATU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-M} } @ARTICLE{Ereshefsky1988, author = {Ereshefsky, Marc}, title = {Individuality and Macroevolutionary Theory}, journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1988}, volume = {1988}, pages = {216--222}, abstract = {A number of authors have argued that the thesis that species are individuals has important implications for macroevolutionary theory. More specifically, some authors claim that the thesis lends support to the Theory of Punctuated Equilibrium and indicates the existence of species selection. In this paper, I argue that the alleged individuality of species is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of that theory or for the existence of species selection. I also argue, contrary to the claims of some, that the individuality of a group is not a necessary requirement for a group to be a unit of selection.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281988%291988%3C216%3AIAMT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P} } @ARTICLE{Fales1982, author = {Fales, Evan}, title = {Natural Kinds and Freaks of Nature}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1982}, volume = {49}, pages = {67--90}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {Essentialism---understood as the doctrine that there are natural kinds---can be sustained with respect to the most fundamental physical entities of the world, as I elsewhere argue. In this paper I take up the question of the existence of natural kinds among complex structures built out of these elementary ones. I consider a number of objections to essentialism, in particular Locke's puzzle about the existence of borderline cases. A number of recent attempts to justify biological taxonomy are critically examined. I conclude that theory partially justifies such taxonomies but supports only a weaker form of essentialism.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198203%2949%3A1%3C67%3ANKAFON%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E} } @ARTICLE{Fales1979, author = {Fales, Evan}, title = {Relative Essentialism}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1979}, volume = {30}, pages = {349--370}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {Very little work has been done to elucidate in any detail how it is that theories determine taxanomical structures. Fales investigages this problem and explains why a better understanding of it sheds light on essentialist theories.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28197912%2930%3A4%3C349%3ARE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L} } @ARTICLE{Feldman2006, author = {Feldman Barrett, L.}, title = {Are Emotions Natural Kinds?}, journal = {Perspectives on Psychological Science}, year = {2006}, volume = {1}, pages = {28-58}, abstract = {Lay people and scientists alike believe that they know anger, or sadness, or fear, when they see it. These emotions and a few others are presumed to have specific causal mechanisms in the brain and properties that are observable (on the face, in the voice, in the body, or in experience)Ñthat is, they are assumed to be natural kinds. If a given emotion is a natural kind and can be identified objectively, then it is possible to make discoveries about that emotion. Indeed, the scientific study of emotion is founded on this assumption. In this article, I review the accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature. I then consider what moving beyond a natural-kind view might mean for the scientific understanding of emotion.}, url = {www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2006.00003.x} } @ARTICLE{Fine1994, author = {Fine, Arthur}, title = {Essence and Modality}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1994}, volume = {8}, pages = {1--16}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583(1994)8%3C1%3AEAMTSP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23} } @ARTICLE{Fisher1995, author = {Fisher, John Andrew}, title = {Is There a Problem of Indiscernible Counterparts?}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {92}, pages = {467--484}, number = {9}, month = {sep}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28199509%2992%3A9%3C467%3AITAPOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y} } @ARTICLE{Fisk1970, author = {Fisk, Milton}, title = {Are There Necessary Connections in Nature?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1970}, volume = {37}, pages = {385--404}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {The following questions are discussed here. Is induction a reasonable procedure in the context of a denial of physically necessary connections?What is physical necessity?If induction does presuppose physical necessity, what amount of it is presupposed?It is argued that with logic as the only restriction on what is to count as a possible world, it is unreasonable to claim that observed connections, whether universal or statistical, will continue to hold. The concept of physical necessity is no more problematic than that of logical necessity, once it is recognized that the necessity of physical and logical necessity is the same. A variant of Keynes'principle of limited independent variety answers the question of the amount of physical necessity presupposed.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197009%2937%3A3%3C385%3AATNCIN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S} } @ARTICLE{Fodor1998, author = {Fodor, J.A.}, title = {Special Sciences : Still Autonomous After all these Years}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1998}, volume = {11}, pages = {149--163}, abstract = {This paper argues that the multiple realizability of psychological states refutes psychophysical reductionism. This paper seeks to defend this "conventional wisdom" against Kim's (1992) challenge.}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624(1997)31%3C149%3ASSSAAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2} } @ARTICLE{Fodor1974, author = {Fodor, J.A.}, title = {Special Sciences or the Disunity of the Sciences as a Working Hypothesis}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {1974}, volume = {28}, pages = {97-115}, abstract = {Many philosophers accept reductivism because they wish to endorse the generality of physics. What has traditionally been called the "unity of science" is a much stronger and less plausible thesis than the generality of physics. Fodor rejects this thesis and puts forward a model for the disunity of science. The multiple realizability of special science kinds refutes reductionism.}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/g2121805q31774r7/} } @ARTICLE{Forbes1981, author = {Forbes, Graeme}, title = {An Anti-Essentialist Note on Substances}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {1981}, volume = {41}, pages = {32--37}, number = {1}, month = {jan}, abstract = {Amongst the variety of essentialist doctrines, we can distinguish between those that do and those which do not, invoke the notion of a natural kind. In this paper, Forbes raises some queries about how these doctrines are to be construed.}, publisher = {The Analysis Committee}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28198101%2941%3A1%3C32%3AAANOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3} } @ARTICLE{Garrett1988, author = {Garrett, Jan Edward}, title = {Persons, Kinds, and Corporations: An Aristotelian View}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1988}, volume = {49}, pages = {261--281}, number = {2}, month = {dec}, abstract = {French's "Collective and Corporate Responsibility" is an ambitious and nuanced study of social ontology. This paper attempts to engage in dialogue with French's position and to reconstruct a defensible Aristotelian alternative.}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28198812%2949%3A2%3C261%3APKACAA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6} } @ARTICLE{Gasper1992, author = {Gasper, Philip}, title = {Reduction and Instrumentalism in Genetics}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, pages = {655--670}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {In his important paper"1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences"(1984), Philip Kitcher defends biological antireductionism, arguing that the division of biology into subfields such as classical and molecular genetics is"not simply... a temporary feature of our science stemming from our cognitive imperfections but [is]the reflection of levels of organization in nature"(p. 371). In a recent discussion of Kitcher's views, Alexander Rosenberg has argued, first, that Kitcher has shown that the reduction of classical to molecular genetics is impossible only because of our intellectual limitations and, second, that this kind of antireductionism supports an instrumentalist approach to biological theory. I argue that both of Rosenberg's claims should be rejected despite the fact that Kitcher misdiagnoses the central reason for the failure of reduction.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199212%2959%3A4%3C655%3ARAIIG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4} } @INCOLLECTION{Ghiselin1999, author = {Michael Ghiselin}, title = {Natural Kinds and Supraorganismal Individuals}, booktitle = {Folkbiology}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1999}, editor = {D. Medin and S. Atran}, pages = {447-60}, address = {Cambridge, Mass.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Ghiselin2002, author = {Ghiselin, M.T.}, title = {Species Concepts : The Basis for Controversy and Reconciliation}, journal = {Fish and Fisheries}, year = {2002}, volume = {3}, pages = {151-160}, number = {3}, abstract = {Some of the disputes about species concepts can be resolved through clarification of the conceptual issues. Others are intractable because incompatible preferences are being optimized. According to the current biological consensus species (taxa) are populations rendered cohesive by sex. The philosophical consensus has it that the species and other categories are (abstract) classes, whereas particular species and other taxa are (concrete) individuals (in the ontological sense). Natural kinds are classes that have the properties they do because of laws of nature. Individuals such as species and clades owe their properties to history, not laws of nature; they are not kinds at all and calling them natural kinds is, therefore, grossly misleading. Having the species of taxonomy be equivalent to the species of evolutionary theory facilitates the integration of history and laws of nature within biology. Efforts to define the species category on the basis of similarity create misleading impressions about the laws and mechanisms of speciation processes. A diversity of incompatible species concepts (pluralism) is undesirable because the various kinds of units that are called`species'differ with respect to the underlying laws of nature that make them natural kinds.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bsc/faf/2002/00000003/00000003/art00003;jsessionid=9ska89l8ghjpm.alice} } @BOOK{Ghiselin1997, title = {Metaphysics and the Origin of Species}, publisher = {SUNY Press}, year = {1997}, author = {Michael Ghiselin}, address = {Albany, N.Y.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Ghiselin1987, author = {MIchael Ghiselin}, title = {Species Concepts, Individuality, and Objectivity}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1987}, volume = {2}, pages = {127--43}, abstract = {Treating species as individuals makes it feasible to treat all the science from a unitary point of view. It clarifies the roles of history and laws of nature. Psychologism may prevent classification systems from meeting the criteria of scientific understanding of the objects classified. Biological species definitions can be treated coherently as reproductive communities, which are composite wholes, or individuals. Evolutionary species definitions, which treat species as ecological entities, are incoherent mixtures of individuals and classes and have an undesirable subjective character. Species are ecolological units only insofar as they affect the ecological aspects of reproduction.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/q627081484v51r6g/} } @ARTICLE{Ghiselin1975, author = {Ghiselin, M.T.}, title = {A Radical Solution to the Species Problem}, journal = {Systematic Zoology}, year = {1975}, volume = {23}, pages = {536-544}, abstract = {Traditionally, species (like other taxa) have been treated as classes (universals). In fact they may be considered individuals (particular things). The logical term "individual" has been confused with a biological synonym for "organism". If species are individuals, then: 1) their names are proper, 2) there cannot be instances of them, 3) they do not have defining properties (intensions), 4) their constituent organisms are parts, not members. Species may be defined as the most extensive units in the natural economy such that reproductive competition occurs among their parts. Species are to evolutionary theory as firms are to economic theory: this analogy resolves many issues, such as the problems of "reality" and the ontological status of nomenclatorial types.}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0039-7989(197412)23%3A4%3C536%3AARSTTS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B} } @ARTICLE{Griffiths2004, author = {Griffiths, P.E.}, title = {Emotions as Natural and Normative Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2004}, volume = {71}, pages = {901-911}, abstract = {In earlier work I have claimed that emotion and some emotions are not`natural kinds'. Here I clarify what I mean by`natural kind', suggesta new and more accurate term, and discuss the objection that emotion and emotions are not descriptive categories at all, but fundamentally normative categories.}, url = {http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/cgi-bin/resolve?id=doi:10.1086/425944} } @ARTICLE{Hacking2007, author = {Hacking, I}, title = {Natural Kinds: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight}, journal = {Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements}, year = {2007}, volume = {82}, pages = {203--239}, abstract = {The rosy dawn of my title refers to that optimistic time when the logical concept of a natural kind originated in Victorian England. The scholastic twilight refers to the present state of affairs. I devote more space to dawn than twilight, because one basic problem was there from the start, and by now those origins have been forgotten. Philosophers have learned many things about classification from the tradition of natural kinds. But now it is in disarray and is unlikely to be put back together again. My argument is less founded on objections to the numerous theories now in circulation, than on the sheer proliferation of incompatible views. There no longer exists what Bertrand Russell called Ôthe doctrine of natural kindsÕÑone doctrine. Instead we have a slew of distinct analyses directed at unrelated projects.} } @ARTICLE{Hacking2002, author = {Hacking, Ian}, title = {How "Natural" Are "Kinds" of Sexual Orientation?}, journal = {Law and Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {21}, pages = {95--107}, number = {1}, month = {jan}, publisher = {Springer}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0167-5249%28200201%2921%3A1%3C95%3AH%22A%22OS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3} } @BOOK{Hacking1999b, title = {The Social Construction of What?}, publisher = {Harvard University Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Hacking, I} } @INCOLLECTION{Hacking1993, author = {Hacking, I}, title = {Working in a New World : The Taxanomic Solution}, booktitle = {World Changes : Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1993} } @ARTICLE{Hacking1991, author = {Hacking, I.}, title = {On Boyd}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {61}, pages = {109--26}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/p1w6072m64466777/} } @ARTICLE{Hacking1991a, author = {Hacking, I}, title = {A Tradition of Natural Kinds}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1991}, volume = {61}, pages = {109--26}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/t51746566j115406/} } @ARTICLE{Hardcastle1998, author = {Hardcastle, Valerie Gray}, title = {On the Matter of Minds and Mental Causation}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1998}, volume = {58}, pages = {1--25}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {There is a difference between someone breaking a glass by accidentally brushing up against it and smashing a glass in a fit of anger. In the first case, the person's cognitive state has little to do with the event, but in the second, the mental state qua anger is quite relevant. How are we to understand this difference?What is the proper way to understand the relation between the mind, the brain, and the resultant behavior?This paper explores the popular"middle ground"reply in which mental phenomena are claimed to be"as real as"other higher level properties. It argues that this solution fails to answer epistemological difficulties surrounding how to chose the appropriate factors in an explanation. A more sophisticated understanding of scientific theorizing and of the relation between ontology and explanation give us a framework in which we can determine when we should refer to mental states as being the causally efficacious agents for some behavior.}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28199803%2958%3A1%3C1%3AOTMOMA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A} } @ARTICLE{Hardcastle1992, author = {Hardcastle, Valerie Gray}, title = {Reduction, Explanatory Extension, and the Mind/Brain Sciences}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1992}, volume = {59}, pages = {408--428}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {In trying to characterize the relationship between psychology and neuroscience, the trend has been to argue that reductionism does not work without suggesting a suitable substitute. I offer explanatory extension as a good model for elucidating the complex relationship among disciplines which are obviously connected but which do not share pragmatic explanatory features. Explanatory extension rests on the idea that one field can"illuminate"issues that were incompletely treated in another. In this paper, I explain how this"illumination"would work between psychology and neuroscience.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199209%2959%3A3%3C408%3AREEATM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U} } @ARTICLE{Harre2005, author = {Harr\'{e}, Rom}, title = {Chemical Kinds and Essences Revisited}, journal = {Foundations of Chemistry}, year = {2005}, volume = {7}, pages = {7--30}, number = {1}, abstract = {Abstract:The philosophical problem of the utility and meaning of essences for chemistry cannot be resolved by Wittgenstein's principle that essence cannot explain use, because use is displayed in a field of family resemblances. The transition of chemical taxonomy from vernacular and mystical based terms to theory based terms stabilized as a unified descriptive taxonomy, removes chemical discourse from its connection with the vernacular. The transition can be tracked using the Lockean concepts of real and nominal essences, and the changing priorities between them. Analyzing properties dispositionally, initiating a search for groundings strengthens the case for a logical asymmetry between descriptive and explanatory discourses. Taxonomy is now driven by explanatory concepts, but not including those from quantum chemistry.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foch/2005/00000007/00000001/05267013;jsessionid=16c9ldxlr944c.henrietta} } @ARTICLE{Haslaam2002, author = {Haslaam, Nick}, title = {Natural kinds, Practical Kinds and Psychiatric Categories}, journal = {Biological Psychiatry}, year = {2002}, volume = {13}, number = {1}, abstract = {Psychological concepts and biological psychiatry"presents a compelling critique of the biomedical materialist approach to mental disorder. This review focuses on its conceptualisation of disorders qua categories, particularly its rejection of the natural kind concept and its proposed concept of practical kinds."}, url = {http://psycprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk/archive/00000193/} } @ARTICLE{Haslam2002, author = {Haslam, Nick}, title = {Kinds of Kinds: A Conceptual Taxonomy of Psychiatric Categories}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2002}, volume = {9}, pages = {203--217}, abstract = {A pluralistic view of psychiatric classification is defended, according to which psychiatric categories take a variety of structural forms. An ordered taxonomy of these forms---non-kinds, practical kinds, fuzzy kinds, discrete kinds, and natural kinds?is presented and exemplified. It is argued that psychiatric categories cannot all be understood as pragmatically grounded, and at least some reflect naturally occurring discontinuities without thereby representing natural kinds. Even if essentialist accounts of mental disorders are generally mistaken, they are not implied whenever a psychiatric category that is not pragmatically grounded is posited.}, url = {http://muse.jhu.edu/cgi-bin/access.cgi?uri=/journals/philosophy_psychiatry_and_psychology/v009/9.3haslam01.html} } @ARTICLE{Heil2005, author = {Heil, J.}, title = {Kinds and Essences}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {2005}, volume = {18 : 4}, pages = {405--419}, abstract = {Brian Ellis advances a robust species of realism he calls Physical Realism. Physical Realism includes an ontology comprising three kinds of universal and three kinds of particular: a six-category ontology. After comparing Physical Realism to a modest two-category ontology inspired by Locke, I mention two apparent difficulties a proponent of a six-category ontology might address.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2005/00000018/00000004/art00003} } @ARTICLE{Hendry2006, author = {Hendry, Robin}, title = {Elements, Compounds and Other Chemical Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2006}, volume = {73}, pages = {864--875}, abstract = {In this article, I assess the problems and prospects of a microstructural approach to chemical substances. Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam famously claimed that to be gold is to have atomic number 79 and to be water is to be H2O. I relate the first claim to the concept of element in the history of chemistry, arguing that the reference of element names is determined by atomic number. Compounds are more difficult: water is so complex and heterogeneous at the molecular level that 'water is H2O' seems false under some interpretations. I sketch a response to this problem.}, url = {http://dro.dur.ac.uk/2776/} } @ARTICLE{Horgan1997a, author = {Horgan, Terence}, title = {Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1997}, volume = {31}, pages = {165--184}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%281997%2931%3C165%3AKOMCAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E} } @ARTICLE{Horgan1996, author = {Horgan, Terence}, title = {Kim on the Mind---Body Problem}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1996}, volume = {47}, pages = {579--607}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {For three decades the writings of Jaegwon Kim have had a major influence in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. Sixteen of his philosophical papers, together with several new postscripts, are collected in Kim [1993]. The publication of this collection prompts the present essay. After some preliminary remarks in the opening section, in Section 2 I will briefly describe Kim's philosophical'big picture'about the relation between the mental and the physical. In Section 3 I will situate Kim's approach on the larger philosophical landscape, vis-a-vis various other approaches frequently discussed in contemporary philosophy of mind. This comparative discussion will further illuminate Kim's own position, and also will serve as groundwork for subsequent discussion. In Section 4 I will point out certain persistent internal tensions in Kim's philosophical position on the mind---body problem, tensions that emerge especially clearly against the backdrop of Section 3's comparative discussion of Kim's position relative to various competing positions. In the remainder of the paper I will focus on two issues at the heart of his position, with particular attention to what he says about them in some of the more recent papers and the postscripts in Kim [1993]. First, how should a materialist understand the notion that the mental is'determined'by the physical?More specifically, what role, if any, should be played by the concept of supervenience in explicating this kind of determination relation?Kim's views on this matter have recently changed, and I will discuss the issue with particular attention to his own latest remarks on it. This is the business of Section 5. Second, need a viable materialism assert that mentalistic psychology is reducible to neurobiology (and ultimately to physics)?More specifically, should a materialist insist on reducibility, despite the currently influential line of argument used by non-reductive materialists, the'multiple realization'argument?On this matter too, Kim's views have changed somewhat; again, I will discuss the issue with particular attention to his recent thinking. This is the business of Section 6.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28199612%2947%3A4%3C579%3AKOTMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K} } @INCOLLECTION{Hull1998, author = {David Hull}, title = {Taxonomy}, booktitle = {Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, publisher = {Routledge}, year = {1998}, editor = {Edward Craig}, volume = {9}, pages = {272--6}, address = {London}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/Q102#Q102P1.13} } @ARTICLE{Hull1976, author = {Hull, D.}, title = {Are Species Really Individuals}, journal = {Systematic Zoology}, year = {1976}, volume = {25}, pages = {174--191}, abstract = {The processes which contribute to the evolution of biological species take place at a variety of levels of organization; e.g. genes give rise to other genes, organisms give rise to other organisms and species give rise to other species. All of these processes require continuity through descent. If species are to be units of evolution, they need not be composed of similiar organisms; instead they must be made up of organisms related by descent. Taxonomists do not impose this requirement on the phenomena; rather it follows from the nature of the evolutionary process itself. In addition to spatiotemporal continuity, species must also possess a certain degree of unity of function as units of evolution. Gene exchange is one means by which unity can be promoted. The mechanisms by which asexual species maintain a similar unity are problematic; higher taxa pose an even more serious problem. However, if species are chunks of the genealogical nexus, they cannot be viewed as classes. Instead they possess all the characteristics of individuals - that is, if organisms are taken to be paradigm individuals. The major difference between organisms and species as individuals is that organisms possess a largely fixed genetic makeup which constrains their development, whereas species do not. If species are individuals, then their names are most naturally viewed as proper names, names which denote particular individuals but do not possess any intensional meaning.}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0039-7989(197606)25%3A2%3C174%3AASRI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L} } @ARTICLE{Hull1965, author = {Hull, D.L.}, title = {The Effect of Essentialism on Taxonomy : 2, 000 Years of Stasis}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1965}, volume = {15}, pages = {314--326}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882(196502)15%3A60%3C314%3ATEOEOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P} } @ARTICLE{Hull1986, author = {Hull, David L.}, title = {On Human Nature}, journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1986}, volume = {1986}, pages = {3--13}, abstract = {If species are the things that evolve at least in large part through the action of natural selection, then both genetic and phenotypic variability are essential to biological species. If all species are variable, then Homo sapiens must be variable. Hence, it is very unlikely that the human species as a biological species can be characterized by a set of invariable traits. It might be the case that at this moment in evolutionary history, all human beings happen to possess a particular set (or unimodal cluster) of traits, but if so, this will be in large part an evolutionary accident. As a result, anyone who proposes to base anything, including ethics, on human nature is basing it on historical happenstance.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281986%291986%3C3%3AOHN%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K} } @ARTICLE{Hull1978a, author = {Hull, David L.}, title = {A Matter of Individuality}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1978}, volume = {45}, pages = {335--360}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {Biological species have been treated traditionally as spatiotemporally unrestricted classes. If they are to perform the function which they do in the evolutionary process, they must be spatiotemporally localized individuals, historical entities. Reinterpreting biological species as historical entities solves several important anomalies in biology, inphilosophy of biology, and within philosophy itself. It also has important implications for any attempt to present an"evolutionary"analysis of science and for sciences such as anthropology which are devoted to the study of single species.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197809%2945%3A3%3C335%3AAMOI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-X} } @ARTICLE{Humphreys1997, author = {Humphreys, Paul}, title = {Emergence, Not Supervenience}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {S337--S345}, month = {dec}, abstract = {I argue that supervenience is an inadequate device for representing relations between different levels of phenomena. I then provide six criteria that emergent phenomena seem to satisfy. Using examples drawn from macroscopic physics, I suggest that such emergent features may well be quite common in the physical realm.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199712%2964%3CS337%3AENS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-8} } @ARTICLE{Jackson1988, author = {Jackson, Frank and Pettit, Philip}, title = {Functionalism and Broad Content}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1988}, volume = {97}, pages = {381--400}, number = {387}, month = {jul}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28198807%292%3A97%3A387%3C381%3AFABC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6} } @ARTICLE{Johnston1997, author = {Johnston, Mark}, title = {Manifest Kinds}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1997}, volume = {94}, pages = {564--583}, number = {11}, month = {nov}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28199711%2994%3A11%3C564%3AMK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B} } @ARTICLE{Kahane1969, author = {Kahane, Howard}, title = {Thomason on Natural Kinds}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1969}, volume = {3}, pages = {409--412}, number = {4}, month = {nov}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28196911%293%3A4%3C409%3ATONK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T} } @ARTICLE{Kim1997, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Moral Kinds and Natural Kinds: What's the Difference: For a Naturalist?}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, year = {1997}, volume = {8}, pages = {293--301}, publisher = {Ridgeview Publishing Company}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077%281997%298%3C293%3AMKANKW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I} } @ARTICLE{Kim1993, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Mental Causation in a Physical World}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, year = {1993}, volume = {3}, pages = {157--176}, publisher = {Ridgeview Publishing Company}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077%281993%293%3C157%3AMCIAPW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C} } @BOOK{Kim1993b, title = {Supervenience and the Mind}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1993}, author = {Kim, Jaegwon} } @ARTICLE{Kim1992, author = {Kim, Jaegwon}, title = {Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1992}, volume = {52}, pages = {1--26}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/view/00318205/di975035/97p03827/0} } @ARTICLE{Kincaid2000, author = {Kincaid, Harold}, title = {Global Arguments and Local Realism about the Social Sciences}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {S667--S678}, month = {sep}, abstract = {This paper argues that realism issue in the social sciences is not one that can be decided by general philosophical arguments that evaluate entire domains at once. The realism issue is instead many different empirical issues. To defend these claims, I sort issues that are often run together, explicate and criticize several standard realist and antirealist arguments about the social sciences, and use the example of the productive/nonproductive distinction to illustrate the approach to realism questions that I favor.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28200009%2967%3CS667%3AGAALRA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-B} } @ARTICLE{Kistler2004, author = {Kistler, M.}, title = {Some Problems for Lowe's Four Category Ontology}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2004}, volume = {64}, pages = {146--151}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/anal/2004/00000064/00000282/art00010} } @INCOLLECTION{Kitcher1989, author = {Philip Kitcher}, title = {Some Puzzles About Species}, booktitle = {What the Philosophy of Zoology Is: Essays Dedicated to David Hull}, publisher = {Kluwer Academic Publishers}, year = {1989}, editor = {M. Ruse}, pages = {183--208}, address = {Boston}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Kitcher1999, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Essence and Perfection}, journal = {Ethics}, year = {1999}, volume = {110}, pages = {59--83}, number = {1}, month = {oct}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0014-1704%28199910%29110%3A1%3C59%3AEAP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W} } @ARTICLE{Kitcher1985, author = {Kitcher, Patricia}, title = {Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1985}, volume = {52}, pages = {78--97}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {Three recent, influential critiques (Stich 1978; Fodor 1981c; Block 1980) have argued that various tasks on the agenda for computational psychology put conflicting pressures on its theoretical constructs. Unless something is done, the inevitable result will be confusion or outright incoherence. Stich, Fodor, and Block present different versions of this worry and each proposes a different remedy. Stich wants the central notion of belief to be jettisoned if it cannot be shown to be sound. Fodor tries to reduce confusion in computational psychology by dismissing some putative tasks as impossible. Block argues that the widespread faith in functionalism is just not warranted. I argue that all these critiques are misguided because they depend on holding cognitive psychology to taxonomic standards that other sciences routinely rise above.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198503%2952%3A1%3C78%3ANTAWF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V} } @ARTICLE{Kitcher1984, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Species}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {308--333}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, abstract = {I defend a view of the species category, pluralistic realism, which is designed to do justice to the insights of many different groups of systematists. After arguing that species are sets and not individuals, I proceed to outline briefly some defects of the biological species concept. I draw the general moral that similar shortcomingsarise for other popular views of the nature of species. These shortcomings arise because the legitimate interests of biology are diverse, and these diverse interests are reflected in different legitimate approaches to the classification of organisms. In the final section, I show briefly how the pluralistic approach can help to illuminate some areas of biological and philosophical dispute.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198406%2951%3A2%3C308%3AS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I} } @ARTICLE{Kitcher1984a, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {1953 and all That. A Tale of Two Sciences}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {1984}, volume = {93}, pages = {335--373}, number = {3}, month = {jul}, publisher = {Cornell University}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28198407%2993%3A3%3C335%3A1AATAT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G} } @ARTICLE{Kitcher1982, author = {Kitcher, Philip}, title = {Genes}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1982}, volume = {33}, pages = {337--359}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28198212%2933%3A4%3C337%3AG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H} } @ARTICLE{Kitts1979, author = {Kitts, David B. and Kitts, David J.}, title = {Biological Species as Natural Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {613--622}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {The fact that the names of biological species refer independently of identifying descriptions does not support the view of Ghiselin and Hull that species are individuals. Species may be regarded as natural kinds whose members share an essence which distinguishes them from the members of other species and accounts for the fact that they are reproductively isolated from the members of other species. Because evolutionary theory requires that species be spatiotemporally localized their names cannot occur in scientific laws. If natural kind status is denied to species on this ground, it must also be denied to most classes of concrete entities which are now accorded such status.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197912%2946%3A4%3C613%3ABSANK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N} } @INCOLLECTION{Kripke1972, author = {Kripke, S.A.}, title = {Naming and Necessity}, booktitle = {Semantics of Natural Language}, publisher = {Dordrecht}, year = {1972}, editor = {G.Harman and D. Davidson} } @INCOLLECTION{Kripke1971, author = {Kripke, S.A.}, title = {Identity and Necessity}, booktitle = {Identity and Individuation}, publisher = {New York University Press}, year = {1971} } @BOOK{Kuhn2000, title = {The Road Since Structure}, publisher = {University of Chicago Press}, year = {2000}, author = {Kuhn, Thomas S.} } @ARTICLE{Lange1995, author = {Marc Lange}, title = {Are There Natural Laws Concerning Particular Biological Species?}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {92}, pages = {430--51}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X(199508)92%3A8%3C430%3AATNLCP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F} } @BOOK{Laporte2004, title = {Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2004}, author = {Laporte, Joseph} } @ARTICLE{LaPorte2000, author = {Joseph LaPorte}, title = {Rigidity and Kind}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {2000}, volume = {97}, pages = {293--316}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/x511w5wn60644247/} } @ARTICLE{LaPorte1997, author = {LaPorte, Joseph}, title = {Essential Membership}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1997}, volume = {64}, pages = {96--112}, number = {1}, month = {mar}, abstract = {In this paper I take issue with the doctrine that organisms belong of their very essence to the natural kinds (or biological taxa, if these are not kinds) to which they belong. This view holds that any human essentially belongs to the species Homo sapiens, any feline essentially belongs to the cat family, and so on. I survey the various competing views in biological systematics. These offer different explanations for what it is that makes a member of one species, family, etc. a member of that taxon. Unfortunately, none of them offers an explanation that is compatible with the essentialism in question.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199703%2964%3A1%3C96%3AEM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E} } @ARTICLE{Leplin1988, author = {Leplin, Jarrett}, title = {Is Essentialism Unscientific?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1988}, volume = {55}, pages = {493--510}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {This paper defends the Causal Theory of Reference against the recent criticism that it imposes a priori constraints on the aims and practices of science. The metaphysical essentialism of this theory is shown to be compatible with the requirements of naturalistic epistemology. The theory is nevertheless unable to forestall the problem of incommensurability for scientific terms, because it misrepresents the conditions under which their reference is fixed. The resources of the Causal Theory of Reference and of the traditional cluster or"network"theory of meaning for handling problems of commensurability are compared, and an alternative approach is recommended.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198812%2955%3A4%3C493%3AIEU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0} } @ARTICLE{Levin2001, author = {Alex Levin}, title = {Individualism, Type Specimens, and the Scrutability of Species Membership}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2001}, volume = {16}, pages = {325--38}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Levin1981, author = {Levin, Michael E.}, title = {Phenomenal Properties}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1981}, volume = {42}, pages = {42--58}, number = {1}, month = {sep}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28198109%2942%3A1%3C42%3APP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0} } @BOOK{Lewis1986, title = {On the Plurality of Worlds}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {1986}, author = {Lewis, David} } @BOOK{Lowe2006, title = {The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2006}, author = {Lowe, E.J.}, address = {Oxford}, bdsk-url-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199254397.001.0001}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199254397.001.0001} } @BOOK{Lowe1998, title = {The Possibility of Metaphysics : Substance, Identity and Time}, publisher = {Oxford Clarendon Press}, year = {1998}, author = {Lowe, E.J.} } @ARTICLE{Lowe2007, author = {E. J. Lowe}, title = {A Problem for A Posteriori Essentialism concerning Natural Kinds}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2007}, volume = {67}, pages = {286--92}, url = {http://dro.dur.ac.uk/4835/} } @ARTICLE{Lowe1997, author = {E. J. Lowe}, title = {Ontological Categories and Natural Kinds}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, year = {1997}, volume = {26}, pages = {29--46}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Lowe1995a, author = {Lowe, E. J.}, title = {The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1995}, volume = {92}, pages = {509--524}, number = {10}, month = {oct}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28199510%2992%3A10%3C509%3ATMOAO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J} } @ARTICLE{MacDonald1990, author = {MacDonald, Cynthia}, title = {Weak Externalism and Mind---Body Identity}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1990}, volume = {99}, pages = {387--404}, number = {395}, month = {jul}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28199007%292%3A99%3A395%3C387%3AWEAMI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P} } @ARTICLE{Mayr1996, author = {Mayr, Ernst}, title = {What Is a Species, and What Is Not?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1996}, volume = {63}, pages = {262--277}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, abstract = {I analyze a number of widespread misconceptions concerning species. The species category, defined by a concept, denotes the rank of a species taxon in the Linnaean hierarchy. Biological species are reproducing isolated from each other, which protects the integrity of their genotypes. Degree of morphological difference is not an appropriate species definition. Unequal rates of evolution of different characters and lack of information on the mating potential of isolated populations are the major difficulties in the demarcation of species taxa.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199606%2963%3A2%3C262%3AWIASAW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H} } @ARTICLE{Mayr1987, author = {Ernst Mayr}, title = {The Ontological Status of Species: Scientific Progress and Philosophical Terminology}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1987}, volume = {2}, pages = {145--66}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{McGinn1975, author = {McGinn, Colin}, title = {A Note on the Essence of Natural Kinds}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {1975}, volume = {35}, pages = {177--183}, number = {6}, month = {jun}, publisher = {The Analysis Committee}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28197506%2935%3A6%3C177%3AANOTEO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-5} } @ARTICLE{Mellor1977, author = {Mellor, D. H.}, title = {Natural Kinds}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1977}, volume = {28}, pages = {299--312}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {In this paper, Mellor challenges the view of natural kind essences to be found in Kripke (1971) and Putnam (1975). Putnam's Twin Earth tales do not dispose of Fregean alternatives to essentialist theory. His own account of the extension of natural kind terms is false of nearly all natural kinds and would not yield essentialism even if it were true. Kripke's theory of the reference of natural kind terms likewise fails to yield essentialism as a product of the necessary self-identity of natural kinds. The stock candidates for essential properties are either not even shared in this world by all things of the kind, or their status is evidently more a feature of their theories than of the world itself. In short, the paper concludes that essentialist premises are false, their arguments invalid and the plausibility of their conclusions specious.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28197712%2928%3A4%3C299%3ANK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-V} } @ARTICLE{Miller2000, author = {Miller, Richard W.}, title = {Half-Naturalized Social Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {S640--S652}, month = {sep}, abstract = {We often legitimately ascribe reality both to social and to natural kinds. But the bases for these ascriptions are not entirely the same. In both cases, reality is typically determined by what characterizations of causal factors are indispensable to adequate explanation. Nonetheless, a psychological role as part of an identity that instances embrace is sometimes, distinctively, a condition for ascribing reality to a social kind. Although such assessments of reality can be construed as employing a standard of causal activity shared with natural science, they reveal a distinctive moral dimension in the bases for ascribing reality to social kinds.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28200009%2967%3CS640%3AHSK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-P} } @ARTICLE{Millikan1999, author = {Millikan, Ruth Garrett}, title = {Historical Kinds and the Special Sciences}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {1999}, volume = {95}, pages = {45--65}, number = {1}, abstract = {I do not believe there are any "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. I think that there is a large group of sciences I will call them "historical sciences" that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind than do the physical sciences. Moreover, the laws, or better, the generalizations, that these kinds support are exceptionless. But heterogeneity is not charcateristic of these generalizations. Indeed, I argue, the idea that there could be a univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. For example, if psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, then there can be no single science that deals with all items having these properties: human psychology, ape psychology, Martian psychology and robot psychology are necessarily different sciences.} } @ARTICLE{Mumford2005, author = {Mumford, Stephen}, title = {Kinds, Essences, Powers}, journal = {Ratio}, year = {2005}, volume = {18 : 4}, pages = {420--436}, abstract = {What is the new essentialist asking us to accept?Not that there are natural kinds, nor that there are intrinsic causal powers. These things could be accepted without a commitment to essentialism. They are asking us to accept something akin to the Kripke-Putnam position: a metaphysical theory about kind-membership in virtue of essential properties. But Salmon has shown that there is no valid argument for the Kripke-Putnam position: no valid inference that gets us from reference to essence. Why then should we accept essentialism?A remaining reason is Ellis's argument by display: we should buy essentialism because of the benefits it will bring. But are these benefits real?The problem is that the putative benefits of essentialism?that the laws of nature are necessary, that the problem of induction is solved, and so on?look actually to be the assumptions of Ellis's theory. If that is the case, there is no real benefit to be gained from adopting the theory. The argument for essentialism is therefore underdetermined and it remains possible to accept natural kinds into one's ontology without accepting their corresponding essences.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/rati/2005/00000018/00000004/art00004} } @ARTICLE{Musgrave1989, author = {Musgrave, Alan}, title = {Noa's Ark---Fine for Realism}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1989}, volume = {39}, pages = {383--398}, number = {157}, month = {oct}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28198910%2939%3A157%3C383%3ANAFR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H} } @ARTICLE{Needham2007, author = {Needham, Paul}, title = {Macroscopic Mixtures}, journal = {Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2007}, volume = {104}, pages = {26--52}, timestamp = {2008.09.15}, url = {http://people.su.se/~pneedham/MacroMixt.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Needham2002, author = {Needham, Paul}, title = {The Discovery that Water is H2O}, journal = {International Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, volume = {16}, pages = {205--226}, timestamp = {2008.09.15} } @ARTICLE{Needham2000, author = {Needham, Paul}, title = {What is Water?}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {2000}, pages = {13--21}, timestamp = {2008.09.15}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119031922/abstract} } @ARTICLE{Needham1995, author = {Needham, Paul}, title = {Mixtures and Modality}, journal = {Foundations of Chemistry}, year = {1995}, volume = {7}, pages = {103--118}, number = {1}, abstract = {Some points are made about substance properties in their role of introducing mass terms. In particular, two conditions of distributivity and cumulativity of mass predicates expressing these properties are not the independent pair they first appear to be. A classification of macroscopic substance concepts is developed. This needs to be complemented in some way by the introduction of a modal qualification reminiscent of Aristotle's distinction between actual and potential presence of substances in a mixture. Consideration of the latter feature has prompted Joe Earley to raise the question of whether there is any salt in the sea. I try to argue that there is.}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/pn3w285015601417/} } @ARTICLE{Needham1993, author = {Needham, Paul}, title = {Stuff}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1993}, volume = {71}, pages = {270--290}, timestamp = {2008.09.15}, url = {http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a739201116~db=all~order=page} } @ARTICLE{Nelson1990, author = {Nelson, A.}, title = {Are Economic Kinds Natural}, journal = {Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1990}, volume = {14}, pages = {102-135} } @ARTICLE{Noonan1987, author = {Noonan, H. W.}, title = {Supervenience}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1987}, volume = {37}, pages = {78--85}, number = {146}, month = {jan}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28198701%2937%3A146%3C78%3AS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-F} } @ARTICLE{Okasha2002, author = {S. Okasha}, title = {Darwinian Metaphysics: Species and the Question of Essentialism}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2002}, volume = {131}, pages = {191--213}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Oliver1996, author = {Oliver, Alex}, title = {The Metaphysics of Properties}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1996}, volume = {105}, pages = {1--80}, number = {417}, month = {jan}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28199601%292%3A105%3A417%3C1%3ATMOP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S} } @ARTICLE{Owens1989, author = {Owens, David}, title = {Disjunctive Laws?}, journal = {Analysis}, year = {1989}, volume = {49}, pages = {197--202}, number = {4}, month = {oct}, publisher = {The Analysis Committee}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-2638%28198910%2949%3A4%3C197%3ADL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D} } @ARTICLE{Pap1960, author = {Pap, Arthur}, title = {Nominalism, Empiricism and Universals---II}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1960}, volume = {10}, pages = {44--60}, number = {38}, month = {jan}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28196001%2910%3A38%3C44%3ANEAU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E} } @ARTICLE{Putman1982, author = {Putman, Daniel A.}, title = {Natural Kinds and Human Artifacts}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1982}, volume = {91}, pages = {418--419}, number = {363}, month = {jul}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28198207%292%3A91%3A363%3C418%3ANKAHA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23} } @INCOLLECTION{Putnam1992a, author = {Hilary Putnam}, title = {Is It Necessary That Water Is H2O?}, booktitle = {The Philosophy of A. J. Ayer}, publisher = {Open Court}, year = {1992}, editor = {L. E. Hahn}, address = {La Salle, Ill.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Putnam1982, author = {Putnam, Hilary}, title = {Three Kinds of Scientific Realism}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1982}, volume = {32}, pages = {195--200}, number = {128}, month = {jul}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28198207%2932%3A128%3C195%3ATKOSR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W} } @INCOLLECTION{Putnam1975a, author = {Hilary Putnam}, title = {The Meaning of `Meaning'}, booktitle = {Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {1975}, pages = {215--71}, address = {Cambridge}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Putnam1973, author = {Putnam, Hilary}, title = {Meaning and Reference}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1973}, volume = {70}, pages = {699--711}, number = {19}, month = {nov}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819731108%2970%3A19%3C699%3AMAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1} } @INCOLLECTION{Quine1969, author = {Quine, W.V.O}, title = {Natural Kinds}, booktitle = {Ontological Relativity and Other Essays}, publisher = {Columbia Univ. Press}, year = {1969} } @BOOK{Quine1969a, title = {Ontological Relativity and Other Essays}, publisher = {Columbia University Press}, year = {1969}, author = {W. V. O. Quine}, chapter = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Reid2002, author = {Jasper Reid}, title = {Natural Kind Essentialism}, journal = {Australian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {2002}, volume = {80}, pages = {62--74}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Ridley1989, author = {Mrk Ridley}, title = {The Cladistic Solution to the Species Problem}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {1989}, volume = {4}, pages = {1--16}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @BOOK{Ridley1986, title = {Evolution and Classification: The Reformation of Cladism}, publisher = {Longman}, year = {1986}, author = {Mark Ridley}, address = {London}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Rosenberg1978, author = {Rosenberg, Alexander}, title = {The Supervenience of Biological Concepts}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1978}, volume = {45}, pages = {368--386}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {In this paper the concept of supervenience is employed to explain the relationship between fitness as employed in the theory of natural selection and population biology and the physical, behavioral and ecological properties of organisms that are the subjects of lower level theories in the life sciences. The aim of this analysis is to account simultaneously for the fact that the theory of natural selection is a synthetic body of empirical claims, and for the fact that it continues to be misconstrued, even by biologists, for a tautological system. The notion of supervenience is then employed to provide a new statement of the relation of Mendelian predicates to molecular ones in order to provide for the commensurability and potential reducibility of Mendelian to molecular genetics in a way that circumvents the theoretical complications which appear to stand in the way of such a reduction.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197809%2945%3A3%3C368%3ATSOBC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T} } @ARTICLE{Rosenberg1987, author = {Rosenberg, Jay F.}, title = {Phenomenological Ontology Revisited: A Bergmannian Retrospective}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1987}, volume = {1}, pages = {387--404}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583%281987%291%3C387%3APORABR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K} } @ARTICLE{Rosenberg1984a, author = {Rosenberg, Jay F.}, title = {Bodies, Corpses, and Chunks of Matter---A Reply to Carter}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1984}, volume = {93}, pages = {419--422}, number = {371}, month = {jul}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28198407%292%3A93%3A371%3C419%3ABCACOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q} } @INCOLLECTION{Rosenfeld2000, author = {Stuart Rosenfeld and Nalini Bhushan}, title = {Chemical Synthesis: Complexity, Similarity, Natural Kinds, and the Evolution of a 'Logic'}, booktitle = {Of Minds and Molecules}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2000}, editor = {Bhushan and Rosenfeld}, pages = {187--207}, address = {Oxford}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Ruse1987, author = {Ruse, Michael}, title = {Biological Species: Natural Kinds, Individuals, or What?}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1987}, volume = {38}, pages = {225--242}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, abstract = {What are biological species?Aristotelians and Lockeans agree that they are natural kinds; but, evolutionary theory shows that neither traditional philosophical approach is truly adequate. Recently, Michael Ghiselin and David Hull have argued that species are individuals. This claim is shown to be against the spirit of much modern biology. It is concluded that species are natural kinds of a sort, and that any'objectivity'they possess comes from their being at the focus of a consilience of inductions.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28198706%2938%3A2%3C225%3ABSNKIO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6} } @ARTICLE{Schwartz1980, author = {Schwartz, Stephen P.}, title = {Natural Kinds and Nominal Kinds}, journal = {Mind}, year = {1980}, volume = {89}, pages = {182--195}, number = {354}, month = {apr}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, series = {2}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-4423%28198004%292%3A89%3A354%3C182%3ANKANK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-0} } @ARTICLE{Shapere1991, author = {Shapere, Dudley}, title = {Leplin on Essentialism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1991}, volume = {58}, pages = {655--677}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {Jarrett Leplin has recently criticized a number of aspects of my views of the aims and goals of science, of the rationale of scientific change, and of the consequent relations between science and the philosophy of science, and in particular of the methodology of the latter (Leplin 1984, 1987, 1988a, 1988b). Here I will respond to those criticisms, and also reply to some related criticisms made by other writers.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199112%2958%3A4%3C655%3ALOE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G} } @ARTICLE{Sharvy1983, author = {Sharvy, Richard}, title = {Aristotle on Mixtures}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1983}, volume = {80}, pages = {439--457}, number = {8}, month = {aug}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28198308%2980%3A8%3C439%3AAOM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O} } @BOOK{Shoemaker2003, title = {Identity, Cause and Mind}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2003}, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney} } @ARTICLE{Shoemaker1990a, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?}, journal = {Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {1990}, volume = {50}, pages = {109--131}, publisher = {International Phenomenological Society}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8205%28199023%2950%3C109%3AQAQWIT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3} } @ARTICLE{Shoemaker1984, author = {Shoemaker, Sydney}, title = {Churchland on Reduction, Qualia, and Introspection}, journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1984}, volume = {1984}, pages = {799--809}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281984%291984%3C799%3ACORQAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-O} } @ARTICLE{Shope1979, author = {Shope, Robert K.}, title = {Eliminating Mistakes about Eliminative Materialism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1979}, volume = {46}, pages = {590--612}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {Richard Rorty's eliminative materialism is an attack on dualism that has frequently been misrepresented and incorrectly criticized. By taking account of the mistakes that philosophers have made concerning eliminative materialism, a proper definition of the doctrine and a clarification of its relation to traditional materialism will emerge, as well as an understanding of its true strengths and weaknesses. The discussion centers around the original manner in which Rorty defended eliminative materialism by means of analogies to the elimination of talk about demons and talk about macroscopic physical objects.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28197912%2946%3A4%3C590%3AEMAEM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R} } @BOOK{Sidelle1989, title = {Necessity, Essence, and Inviduation: A Defence of Conventionalism}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, year = {1989}, author = {Alan Sidelle}, address = {Ithaca, N.Y.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Simonian2005, author = {Simonian, Joseph}, title = {The Paradoxes of Chemical Classification : Why'water is H2O'is not an identity statement}, journal = {Foundations of Chemistry}, year = {2005}, volume = {7}, pages = {49--56}, number = {1}, abstract = {A puzzle for identity statements using mass nouns, central to the expression of chemical types, arises if one accepts that both`Water is H2O'and`Ice is H2O'are identity statements, since they jointly entail that`Water is ice'. The puzzle is resolved if it can be shown that the`is'of such statements is not the`is'of identity.}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/klu/foch/2005/00000007/00000001/05267015} } @ARTICLE{Soames2006, author = {Soames, Scott}, title = {Philosophical Implications of the Kripkean Necessary A Posteriori}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, year = {2006}, volume = {16}, pages = {Forthcoming}, abstract = {Kripke's discovery of the necessary aposteriori is placed in historical and philosophical perspective. I argue that his first, essentialist, route to the necessary aposteriori has led to a distinction between metaphysical and epistemic possibility that is an important advance, while his second route to the necessary aposteriori has led to an attempted revival of pre-Kripkean orthodoxy which both threatens that advance, and leads to suspect philosophical results-including his own flawed argument against mind-body identity theories.}, url = {http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~soames/sel_pub/Kripkean_Necessary_Aposteriori.pdf} } @ARTICLE{Sober1999, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {The Multiple Realizability Argument against Reductionism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1999}, volume = {66}, pages = {542--564}, number = {4}, month = {dec}, abstract = {Reductionism is often understood to include two theses: (1) every singular occurrence that the special sciences can explain also can be explained by physics; (2) every law in a higher-level science can be explained by physics. These claims are widely supposed to have been refuted by the multiple realizability argument, formulated by Putnam (1967, 1975) and Fodor (1968, 1975). The present paper criticizes the argument and identifies a reductionistic thesis that follows from one of the argument's premises.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28199912%2966%3A4%3C542%3ATMRAAR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N} } @ARTICLE{Sober1984, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {Sets, Species, and Evolution: Comments on Philip Kitcher's"Species"}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1984}, volume = {51}, pages = {334--341}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198406%2951%3A2%3C334%3ASSAECO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-%23} } @ARTICLE{Sober1980, author = {Sober, Elliott}, title = {Evolution, Population Thinking, and Essentialism}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1980}, volume = {47}, pages = {350--383}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {Ernst Mayr has argued that Darwinian theory discredited essentialist modes of thought and replaced them with what he has called"population thinking". In this paper, I characterize essentialism as embodying a certain conception of how variation in nature is to be explained, and show how this conception was undermined by evolutionary theory. The Darwinian doctrine of evolutionary gradualism makes it impossible to say exactly where one species ends and another begins; such line-drawing problems are often taken to be the decisive reason for thinking that essentialism is untenable. However, according to the view of essentialism I suggest, this familiar objection is not fatal to essentialism. It is rather the essentialist's use of what I call the natural state model for explaining variation which clashes with evolutionary theory. This model implemented the essentialist's requirement that properties of populations be defined in terms of properties of member organisms. Requiring such constituent definitions is reductionistic in spirit; additionally, evolutionary theory shows that such definitions are not available, and, moreover, that they are not needed to legitimize population-level concepts. Population thinking involves the thesis that population concepts may be legitimized by showing their connections with each other, even when they are not reducible to concepts applying at lower levels of organization. In the paper, I develop these points by describing Aristotle's ideas on the origins of biological variation; they are a classic formulation of the natural state model. I also describe how the development of statistical ideas in the 19th century involved an abandoning of the natural state model.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198009%2947%3A3%3C350%3AEPTAE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7} } @ARTICLE{Sosa1997, author = {Sosa, Ernest}, title = {Water, Drink, and "Moral Kinds"}, journal = {Philosophical Issues}, year = {1997}, volume = {8}, pages = {303--312}, publisher = {Ridgeview Publishing Company}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1533-6077%281997%298%3C303%3AWDA%22K%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K} } @ARTICLE{Splitter1988, author = {Splitter, Laurance J.}, title = {Species and Identity}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1988}, volume = {55}, pages = {323--348}, number = {3}, month = {sep}, abstract = {The purpose of this paper is to test the contemporary concept of biological species against some of the problems caused by treating species as spatiotemporally extended entities governed by criteria of persistence, identity, etc. After outlining the general problem of symmetric division in natural objects, I set out some useful distinctions (section 1) and confirm that species are not natural kinds (section 2). Section 3 takes up the separate issue of species definition, focusing on the Biological Species Concept (BSC). Sections 4 and 5 examine the matter of species identity over space and time respectively, as determined by the BSC. Both gradualistic and punctuated equilibrium models of speciation are discussed. In section 6 I argue that the BSC fails to determine adequate criteria for dealing with certain kinds of speciation. Section 7 moves speculatively beyond the BSC to a brief examination of alternatives.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28198809%2955%3A3%3C323%3ASAI%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J} } @ARTICLE{Splitter1980, author = {Laurance J. Splitter}, title = {McGinn and essential properties of natural kinds}, journal = {Australasian Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1980}, volume = {58 (1)}, pages = {19--24} } @ARTICLE{Stalnaker1989, author = {Stalnaker, Robert}, title = {On What's In the Head}, journal = {Philosophical Perspectives}, year = {1989}, volume = {3}, pages = {287--316}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=1520-8583%281989%293%3C287%3AOWITH%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A} } @ARTICLE{Stenwall2007, author = {Stenwall, Robin}, title = {Aspect Kinds}, journal = {Boston studies in the philosophy of science}, year = {2007}, volume = {252}, pages = {193--203} } @ARTICLE{Steward1990, author = {Steward, Helen}, title = {Identity Statements and the Necessary a Posteriori}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1990}, volume = {87}, pages = {385--398}, number = {8}, month = {aug}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%28199008%2987%3A8%3C385%3AISATNA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R} } @ARTICLE{Teller1975, author = {Teller, Paul}, title = {Essential Properties: Some Problems and Conjectures}, journal = {The Journal of Philosophy}, year = {1975}, volume = {72}, pages = {233--248}, number = {9}, month = {may}, abstract = {This paper looks at problems and prospects for a characterization of essential properties. The concern with the topic is motivated from an interest in characterizing natural kinds.}, publisher = {Journal of Philosophy, Inc.}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819750508%2972%3A9%3C233%3AEPSPAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1} } @ARTICLE{Thomason1969, author = {Thomason, Richmond H.}, title = {Species, Determinates and Natural Kinds}, journal = {Nous}, year = {1969}, volume = {3}, pages = {95--101}, number = {1}, month = {feb}, publisher = {Blackwell Publishing}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0029-4624%28196902%293%3A1%3C95%3ASDANK%3E2.0.CO%3B2-W} } @ARTICLE{Brakel1992, author = {Van Brakel, J.}, title = {Natural Kinds and Manifest Forms of Life}, journal = {Dialectica}, year = {1992}, abstract = {In this paper I try to make sense of and give provisional answers to question like: Are there interesting theories about natural kinds (distinguishing them form other kinds)? Are some classifications or categorisations more natural than others? Does it matter whether or not there are natural kinds? To get an initial feel for the subject let's consider some suggestions from the literature as to what might count as a candidate for a natural kind or natural kind term.}, keywords = {Natural Kinds}, timestamp = {2008.09.15}, url = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/119317671/abstract} } @ARTICLE{VihaleemMay2003, author = {Vihaleem, Rein}, title = {Natural Kinds, Explanation and Essentialism in Chemistry}, journal = {Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences}, year = {May 2003}, volume = {988}, pages = {59-70}, number = {1}, abstract = {The problem of natural kinds in chemistry is analyzed, proceeding mainly from Rom Harr\'{e}'s and Jaap van Brakel's writings. The problem of natural kinds proves to be different in general philosophy and in philosophy of science. This problem, which originally emerged at the borderline of science and philosophy, belongs to the domain of philosophy of science. Philosophy in general cannot hope that scientific knowledge will help to explain philosophical issues. Chemistry has to be taken very seriously in philosophy of science. Not only do empirical arguments indicate that chemistry should be regarded as a typical science, but it is also relevant for elaborating a theoretical model of science. Chemistry as the science of substances is well suited for the philosophical analysis of the role of the concept of natural kinds in science. The viability of the concept of a natural kind in philosophy of chemistry derives from the explanatory role of chemical natural kinds. The problem of explanation in its turn relates natural kinds to the laws of nature and scientific theories, that is, to classical issues in philosophy of science and to discussions on their (supposed) specificity in chemistry. In philosophy of science, one can demonstrate that there exists a third option between metaphysical realism and internal realism (to use Putnam's terminology). According to this third type of realism our"world versions"(including natural kinds identified by us), but not the world itself, are relative to us.}, url = {http://www.annalsnyas.org/cgi/content/abstract/988/1/59} } @ARTICLE{Walsh2006, author = {Walsh, D. M.}, title = {Evolutionary Essentialism}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2006}, volume = {57}, pages = {425--448}, number = {2}, abstract = {According to Aristotelian essentialism, the nature of an organism is constituted of a particular goal-directed disposition to produce an organism typical of its kind. This paper arguesÑagainst the prevailing orthodoxyÑthat essentialism of this sort is indispensable to evolutionary biology. The most powerful anti-essentialist arguments purport to show that the natures of organisms play no explanatory role in modern synthesis biology. I argue that recent evolutionary developmental biology provides compelling evidence to the contrary. Developmental biology shows that one must appeal to the capacities of organisms to explain what makes adaptive evolution adaptive. Moreover, the specific capacities in question are precisely those that, according to Aristotle, constitute the nature of an organism.} } @ARTICLE{Walsh2000, author = {D. M. Walsh}, title = {Chasing shadows: natural selection and adaptation}, journal = {Studies in History and Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {31 (1)}, pages = {135--53} } @ARTICLE{Waters1990, author = {Waters, C. Kenneth}, title = {Why the Anti-Reductionist Consensus Won't Survive: The Case of Classical Mendelian Genetics}, journal = {PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association}, year = {1990}, volume = {1990}, pages = {125--139}, abstract = {Philosophers now treat the relationship between classical genetics and molecular biology as a paradigm of nonreduction and this example is playing an increasingly prominent role in debates about the reducibility of theories in other sciences. This paper shows that the anti-reductionist consensus about genetics will not withstand serious scrutiny. In addition to defusing the main anti-reductionist objections, this critical analysis uncovers tell-tale signs of a significant reduction in progress. It also identifies philosophical issues relevant to gaining a better understanding of what is now happening in genetics and of what we might expect to happen in other sciences.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0270-8647%281990%291990%3C125%3AWTACWS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-2} } @BOOK{Wilkerson1995, title = {Natural Kinds}, publisher = {Ashgate Publishing Ltd.}, year = {1995}, author = {Wilkerson, T.E.} } @ARTICLE{Wilkerson1988, author = {Wilkerson, T.E.}, title = {Natural Kinds}, journal = {Philosophy}, year = {1988}, volume = {63}, pages = {29-42}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/oup/mind/1996/00000105/00000419/art00514} } @ARTICLE{Wilkerson1993, author = {Wilkerson, T. E.}, title = {Species, Essences and the Names of Natural Kinds}, journal = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {1993}, volume = {43}, pages = {1--19}, number = {170}, month = {jan}, publisher = {The Philosophical Quarterly}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8094%28199301%2943%3A170%3C1%3ASEATNO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q} } @ARTICLE{Wilson2000, author = {Wilson, Jack A.}, title = {Ontological Butchery: Organism Concepts and Biological Generalizations}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2000}, volume = {67}, pages = {S301--S311}, month = {sep}, abstract = {Biology lacks a central organism concept that unambiguously marks the distinction between organism and non-organism because the most important questions about organisms do not depend on this concept. I argue that the two main ways to discover useful biological generalizations about multicellular organization---the study of homology within multicellular lineages and of convergent evolution across lineages in which multicellularity has been independently established---do not require what would have to be a stipulative sharpening of an organism concept.}, publisher = {The University of Chicago Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8248%28200009%2967%3CS301%3AOBOCAB%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H} } @ARTICLE{Wilson1982, author = {Wilson, Mark}, title = {Predicate Meets Property}, journal = {The Philosophical Review}, year = {1982}, volume = {91}, pages = {549--589}, number = {4}, month = {oct}, abstract = {When we speak of a predicate's extension, we intend to delineate the class of objects of which it is true. Unfortunately, in some common situations the proper ground for determining whether a predicate is true of a particular individual becomes uncertain or ambiguous. One kind of situation in which this can happen is one in which the linguistic community if unaware of the existence of kinds of objects to which a predicate might be thought to apply. This paper discusses some fictional and real life examples of this phenomenon.}, publisher = {Cornell University}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0031-8108%28198210%2991%3A4%3C549%3APMP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U} } @BOOK{Wilson1999, title = {Species: new interdisciplinary essays}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1999}, author = {Wilson, Robert A.}, address = {Cambridge, MA}, issn = {0585102708 9780585102702}, keywords = {Species, Natural Kinds} } @ARTICLE{Wilson1996, author = {Wilson, Robert A.}, title = {Promiscuous Realism}, journal = {The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {1996}, volume = {47}, pages = {303--316}, number = {2}, month = {jun}, abstract = {This paper is a critical discussion of John Dupre's recent defence of promiscuous realism. Dupre's chief strategy of argumentation appeals to debates within the philosophy of biology, all of which concern the nature of species. While the strategy is well motivated, I argue that Dupre's challenge to essentialist and unificationist views about natural kinds is not successful. One conclusion is that an integrative conception of species is a real alternative to Dupre's pluralism.}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, url = {http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0007-0882%28199606%2947%3A2%3C303%3APR%3E2.0.CO%3B2-R} }