PHIL 20009: Epistemology

First Semester 2005 - 2006
TIME AND PLACE: Tuesdays 16:10-17:00, Lecture Theatre 2

Unit director: Ioannis Votsis

Lecturer: Ioannis Votsis
E-mail: i.votsis@bristol.ac.uk
Office hours (Room B37):     Wednesdays 11:00-12:00
                                                 Thursdays 17:00-18:00

Tutors:
Amir Karbasizadeh            email:    amir.karbasizadeh@bristol.ac.uk
Huginn Thorsteinsson        email:    h.thorsteinsson.04@bristol.ac.uk
David Walker                      email:    pldjw@bristol.ac.uk

Introduction

Epistemology is the philosophical investigation of knowledge, belief and a cluster of properties our beliefs have or should have: justification, rationality, warrant, coherence, reliability and truth. We will investigate the nature of our beliefs and belief-forming capacities, asking a variety of questions: What relations do our beliefs stand in to the world, and to each other? What relations do they stand in to other items, such as our perceptual states or our evolutionary past? Which of these relations determine whether a token belief is knowledge? Perhaps in relation to our answers to these questions we will be able to say what knowledge is, how much knowledge we have, if any, and which methods can potentially increase our knowledge.

Essential Textbook
Kim, J. and E. Sosa (eds.) (2000) Epistemology: An Anthology, Oxford: Blackwell

Recommended Textbook
Greco, J. and E. Sosa (eds.) (1999) The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell

Workload:
Two essays (essay titles) plus coursework for seminar. Suggested essay topics will be distributed in the next few weeks.

BA: The article can be found in the Kim and Sosa anthology.
BG: The article can be found in the Greco and Sosa guide.

1. The Nature of Justification

Essential Reading:
L. Bonjour, ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’ (BG)

Further Reading:
A. Morton, Guide Through the Theory of Knowledge, chs. 1 and 2
E. Sosa, ‘The Raft and the Pyramid’ (BA)
J. Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch.4 and ch.5.1
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, chs. 22 and 23

2. Defining Knowledge I: Inferences and Defeaters

Essential Reading:
E. Gettier, ‘Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?’ (BA)
P. Klein, ‘A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge’ (BA)

Further Reading:
L. Zagzabski, ‘What is Knowledge?’ (BG)
M. Kaplan, (1985) ‘It’s Not What you Know that Counts’, Journal of Philosophy
J. Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch.2
E. Sosa, (1964) ‘The Analysis of “Knowing that p” ’, Analysis
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, chs. 5, 9-11
G. Harman, ‘Selections from Thought’ (BA)
K. Lehrer and T. Paxson, (1969) ‘Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief’, Journal of Philosophy

3. Defining Knowledge II: Causes and Reliability

Essential Reading:
A. Goldman, ‘What is Justified Belief?’ (BA) - Reliability

Further Reading:
Causation:
A. Goldman (1967) ‘A Causal Theory of Knowing’, Journal of Philosophy
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, ch. 8
Reliability:
R. Feldman, (1985) ‘Reliability and Justification’, The Monist
R. Brandom, (1998) ‘Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism’, The Monist
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, chs. 6 and 7
E. Connee and R. Feldman, ‘ The Generality Problem for Reliabilism’ (BA)

4. Defining Knowledge III: Tracking the Truth

Essential Reading:
R. Nozick ‘Knowledge and Skepticism’ (BA)

Further Reading:
A. Goldman, (1976) ‘Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge’, Journal of Philosophy
E. Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature, ch. 3
S. Luper-Foy, ‘Introduction’, The Possibility of Knowledge
R. Fumerton, ‘Nozick’s Epistemology’ in Luper-Foy’s The Possibility of Knowledge
J. Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, ch.3

5. Internalism vs. Externalism

Essential Reading:
H. Kornblith (1989) ‘Introspection and Misdirection’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy.

Further Reading:
R. Foley, ‘Skepticism and Rationality’ (BA)
L. Bonjour and E. Sosa, Epistemic Justification
D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, ch. 5
R. Brandom, (1998) ‘Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism’, The Monist

6. Rejecting the Counterexamples

Essential Reading:
S. Heatherington (1998) ‘Actually Knowing’, Philosophical Quarterly

Further Reading:
T. Williamson, (1995) ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind?’, Mind
T. Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, chs. 1 and 2
B. Weatherson, (2003) ‘What Good are Counterexamples’, Philosophical Studies

7. Naturalizing Epistemology

Essential Reading:
J. Kim, ‘What is “Naturalized Epistemology”?’ (BA)

Further Reading:
W.V.O Quine, ‘Epistemology Naturalized’ (BA)
D. Papineau, Philosophical Naturalism, ch. 5
H. Kornblith, Knowledge and its Place in Nature, chs. 1 and 2
T. Williamson, (1995) ‘Is Knowing a State of Mind?’, Mind
M. Sainsbury, (1997) ‘Easy Possibilities’, Phil. and Phenomenological Research

8. Scepticism

Essential Reading:
P. Unger, ‘An Argument for Skepticism’ (BA)

R. Nozick, ‘Knowledge and Skepticism’ (BA)
B. Stroud, ‘The Problem of the External World’ (BA)
G.E. Moore, ‘Proof of an External World’ (BA)
F. Dretske, (1970) ‘Epistemic Operators’, Journal of Philosophy
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, chs. 18 and 19

9. Contextualism

Essential Reading:
K. DeRose, ‘Solving the Sceptical Problem’ (BA)

Further Reading:
K. DeRose, ‘Contextualism, an Explanation and Defence’ (BG)
D. Lewis, ‘Elusive Knowledge’ (BA)
S. Cohen, ‘Contextualist Solutions to Epistemological Problems’ (BA)
S. Cohen, (2000) ‘Contextualism and Skepticism’, Philosophical Issues
S. Heatherington, Knowledge Puzzles, ch. 24

10. Intuitions And Their Role In Defining Knowledge

Essential Reading:
H. Kornblith, Knowledge and its Place in Nature, ch. 1

Further Reading:
G. Bealer, ‘The Incoherence of Empiricism’, in S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical       Appraisal.
R. Cummins, ‘Reflection on Reflective Equilibrium’, in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.) Rethinking Intuition:  The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry
F. Spicer, ‘Knowledge and the Heuristics of Folk Epistemology’ in V.F. Hendricks and D.H. Pritchard (eds.)    New Waves in Epistemology, forthcoming.
S. Stich, The Fragmentation of Reason: Preface to a Pragmatic Theory of Cognitive Evaluation, ch. 4
B. Weatherson, (2003) ‘What Good are Counterexamples’, Philosophical Studies

Essay Titles

The Nature of Justification

1. Is Foundationalism/Coherentism a good account of justification?
2. How should we escape Agrippa’s trilemma?

Defining Knowledge I: Inference and Defeaters

1. Is Knowledge justified true belief involving no false lemmas?
2. Compare the no false lemmas to the no true defeater account.

Defining Knowledge II: Causes and Reliability

1. Can we only know about those things that we are causally in touch with?
2. What is the generality problem for reliabilism?

Defining Knowledge III: Tracking the Truth

1. Is Nozick’s theory resistant to counterexamples?
2. Can Nozick’s theory give a satisfactory reply to the sceptical problem?

Internalism and Externalism

1. Can we know without knowing that we know?
2. What does Kornblith think of introspection? How do his conclusions bear on the internalism vs. externalism debate?

Rejecting the Counterexamples

1. Can one have lucky knowledge?
2. How do we know when we’ve hit on the right definition of knowledge?

Naturalising Epistemology

1. What, if anything, is appealing about naturalised epistemology?
2. Can we successfully purge epistemology from normative elements?

Scepticism

1. Does Jake have evidence which supports his belief that he is not a brain in a vat?
2. Does knowing that p give one the right to be absolutely certain that p?

Contextualism

1. Is the claim that the term ‘knowledge’ is context-sensitive a genuinely epistemological claim?
2. Can contextualism help solve the sceptical problem?

The Role Intuitions Play in Defining Knowledge

1. What role, if any, should intuitions play in the pursuit to define knowledge?
2. Can we investigate knowledge itself, without investigating the concept of knowledge?