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The history of ethics is a long and rich one extending as far back as the history of philosophy itself. Socrates was primarily interested in ethical questions and ethics comprises an important part of the work of both Plato and Aristotle. An understanding of the history of ethics is important to understanding and appreciating many debates and theories (including contemporary ones). For instance, ancient philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle focus on the question of what makes for a good life and this, in turn, has led them to develop theories of virtue and character. Modern philosophers, on the other hand, have tended to focus more on the ethical requirements others place on the individual and so have been led to develop theories of duty, obligation, and right conduct. This contrast has recently been the locus of an important debate in contemporary ethics.
Ancient and modern ethical theories differ in three main respects: (1) the subject matter of ethics; (2) the basic ethical concepts they appeal to; and (3) the relationship between the ethical and the political. Ancient ethics is concerned with what makes for a good human life (i.e., it is fundamentally self-regarding); modern ethics, on the other hand, is other-regarding in that it is concerned with the constraints or requirements that others are capable of placing on us. These differences lead to a second, that ancient ethics appeals to virtue and character to give an account of the good life; whereas modern ethics appeals to standards of right conduct and obligation. Finally, in ancient ethics the state is taken to have an active role in cultivating the virtues in those citizens most capable of developing them; while in modern ethics the role of the state is liberal (i.e., individuals are left to pursue their own good) and citizens are conceived as fundamentally equal.
Contractarianism is a moral theory which has its roots in Plato’s Republic, it holds that moral standards are the result of agreement. The theory has since been developed in two distinct strands. Hobbesians (Hobbes, Hume, and Gauthier) understand the agreement to be one among self-interested agents seeking to maximise their own good. Kantians (Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls) understand the agreement to be one arrived at under fair conditions. Some contractarians insist that the theory captures all there is to morality (e.g., Hobbes and Gauthier), while others think that it only elucidates one aspect of morality such as justice (e.g., Hume and Rawls). The theory is subject to many questions from critics, such as: Does it provide an adequate account of the content of morality? What does the theory imply about the scope of moral requirements (e.g., about the non-rational or disadvantaged)? Can the theory provide an adequate account of the force of moral requirements?
Consequentialism is a theory which has its origins in Hume, but was subsequently developed as a distinctive theory by Bentham and Mill. It defines the right in terms of the good impartially conceived, most commonly in terms of maximising the good. Consequentialists have offered different accounts of the good: pleasure (hedonism), desire-satisfaction, or an objective-list account. Act-consequentialists insist that the right act is that which maximises the good, while rule-consequentialists insist that the right act is that which conforms to a rule which maximises the good. Consequentialism has been the object of numerous criticisms, such as: the theory cannot account for justice and rights (i.e., fails to accommodate agent-centred restrictions); it is too demanding (i.e., it fails to accommodate agent-centred options); it violates the integrity of agents; and it gives a skewed account of moral reasoning and human psychology. More recently many consequentialists have sought to develop indirect consequentialism in an attempt to deal with many of these problems.
Kantianism is the dominant deontological ethical theory. A deontological theory denies that the right action is that which maximises the good and instead insists that certain actions are a matter of duty or obligation (e.g., telling the truth is an obligation—it is the right thing to do even in cases where lying would produce better consequences). According to Kantians, the right action is that which passes the test of the categorical imperative (i.e., actions must not merely be means-ends rational but must be universalisable). Kant thought that the categorical imperative demonstrates that rational agents are valuable as ‘ends-in-themselves’ and may not be treated as mere means. The main problem for the Kantian view is demonstrating how morality is grounded in reason (i.e., that the categorical imperative is the fundamental principle of rationality and that it is capable of generating substantive moral requirements). Contemporary Kantians have grappled with this and other issues.
Virtue ethics is an ethical theory which is based largely on the theories of Plato and Aristotle. Unlike consequentialists virtue ethicists deny that ethics is concerned with the impartial maximisation of the good. Unlike Kantians virtue ethicists deny that ethics involves duty or obligation. Much of contemporary virtue ethics is, therefore, concerned with demonstrating what is wrong with its contemporary theoretical rivals. Positively speaking, according to virtue ethicists, ethics is concerned with virtue and character. The virtues are those traits of character possession of which leads to or makes for a flourishing human life. The main problem virtue ethicists face is in developing a positive theory that constitutes a genuine alternative to its rivals. Many contemporary virtue theories have also been criticised for being too relativistic (though Plato’s and Aristotle’s own theories are clearly non-relativistic).
Anti-theory is the name for a contemporary movement which is critical or sceptical of certain forms or aspects of ethical theorising. Among the claims that have been made by anti-theorists are the following: that efforts to formulate an ethical decision procedure are hopeless; that appeals to general principles are misguided; that it is not possible to formulate a systematic ethical theory (though theory may be effective in more narrow domains); that it is not possible to develop a foundation for ethics; that ethical theorising has a corrupting effect on ethics or other aspects of human life. Some anti-theorists are more or less closely allied with virtue ethicists, but they differ in their attitudes toward and aspirations for positive ethical theory.
Rights entitle their possessors to liberties, claims, powers, and immunities. Legal rights of these kinds are well-known and relatively well-understood. For instance, someone in the US has a legal right to a trial by jury if charged with a crime because Amendment VI of the Bill of Rights establishes that right. Legal rights, then, are the products of institutions. But many think that there are moral or human rights which people have independently of or prior to their being granted those rights in any institutional context—they acquire them simply in virtue of their humanity. Moral or human rights (such as those in the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights—rights not to be tortured, rights to have one’s basic needs provided for) are often appealed to to criticise legal institutions. Philosophers are interested in the various conceptual questions raised by the notion of rights; the status and foundation of moral or human rights; and the extent to which there are such rights (e.g., whether there are positive as well as negative rights) and whether they are absolute and universal.
A set of issues concerning the moral limits of the law. To what extent should people be left at liberty to do what they want? May the state forbid conduct because it is harmful to others, offensive, deemed morally wrong (though neither harmful nor offensive), or harmful to the actor? These questions are the concern of ethicists and philosophers of law who seek a theory or a set of principles about the moral limits of the law. Liberals, such as Mill, argue that only harm to others (some liberals would also include offence) are the only justifiable grounds for limitations to liberty. Conservatives, on the other hand, argue that moralism and/or paternalism also justify restrictions on liberty. Such theories have clear ramifications for issues such as free speech, pornography, smoking, drug use, homosexuality, and religious practices.
This is a set of interconnected and related issues. Most people intuitively accept that others can be held responsible and punished only if they acted of their own freewill. One important question, therefore, concerns whether people can be held morally responsible and punished if determinism is true. At the same time that we think responsibility requires freewill we also find that our judgements about responsibility are influenced by considerations of luck. Can we reconcile the role of luck in morality? There are also questions about the conditions under which people are rightly held responsible as certain factors excuse or diminish responsibility (e.g., coercion, duress, insanity, etc.). Finally, there are various theories about the role, function, or justification for punishment: is it deterrence, retribution, education, or something else? Is capital punishment justified?
This is another set of related issues revolving around common sense moral categories and concepts which are problematic in various respects (mostly from a consequentialist perspective). According to the doctrine of the double-effect some bad effect is worse if it is the intended consequence of one’s action than if it is a foreseen but unintended consequence. Intuitively many people believe this and it forms a part of many moral judgements, yet consequentialists object to it and the question has been raised whether and how it is justified. The same kinds of objection has been raised about acts and omissions: as an act and an omission may both have identical consequences (e.g., someone’s death), but many intuitively think that the act would be worse than the omission. Finally, as part of common sense morality people think that some actions go above and beyond the call of duty—they are supererogatory. The difficulty is giving an account of what supererogatory actions are (particularly for consequentialists since they insist that the right action is that which maximises the good). These issues also connect up with the debate between consequentialists and deontologists about the status of agent-centred options and restrictions (see Consequentialism) and connect up with numerous practical debates (see Abortion and Euthanasia).
Moral sceptics call into question the objective aspirations or presuppositions of ethical practice. Sceptics have advanced a wide variety of arguments in support of their view. They have argued that the wide variety of ethical codes and practices we find in the world around us is evidence that there are no objective moral standards—for if there were, there would be more agreement (see Moral Relativism). They have argued that in ethics observational evidence cannot play the same role as it does in science. They have argued that ethics fails to have objective validity because there is no divine being to underwrite it. They have argued that objective ethical norms are metaphysically and epistemologically queer. They have argued that moral requirements lack rational authority; that there is nothing to say to the amoralist; and that the egoist demonstrates that it is irrational to be ethical. Two distinct strains of moral scepticism can be distinguished: metaphysical/epistemological scepticism and practical/rational scepticism. Answering these sceptical challenges has been one of the central concerns of metaethical theories.
Moral realism is one response to moral scepticism. Moral realists hold that there are moral facts which are independent of our beliefs or attitudes about them (i.e., they are real properties of the world and not projections of our attitudes or constituted by our beliefs). Moral realists, however, differ about what they take moral facts to consist in. Non-naturalists (e.g., Plato and Moore) insist that moral facts are non-natural properties which are apprehended by a faculty of intuition (akin to mathematical knowledge) and are capable of motivating action. Naturalists insist that moral facts consist of ordinary natural properties—some see them as analogous to secondary qualities (such as colours), while others go further and insist that they can play an explanatory role. The debate about moral realism is a recent one and there are still many questions to be answered about the ontology and epistemology of moral facts and their connection with moral reasons and motivation.
Non-cognitivism or expressivism, as it is now more commonly called, is the theoretical descendant of Hume. It is a naturalist anti-realist theory according to which moral utterances are expressions (not reports) of the speaker’s attitudes. When someone says ‘torture is wrong’ they are simply expressing an attitude of disapproval toward torture. Put this way the theory has an anti-objectivist look. But most expressivists (including Hume himself) try to show how the theory can capture the objective features of our moral practices. Contemporary expressivists have attempted to improve the theory in this regard, though many still object to expressivism as inadequate to the task. Many expressivists have also sought to ground the theory in scientific theories of evolution and human nature. Prescriptivism is a variant of expressivism with connections to Kant and is defended by Hare.
A set of deeply related issues about reason and motivation. Practical rationality is concerned with the rationality of action (as opposed to belief). The two main views are represented by Hume and Kant. Hume argued that reason alone cannot motivate action and that all action has passion or desire at its source. Reason, Hume argued, is a mere instrument which tells us how to satisfy the passions. Kant sought, on the other hand, to show that reason can move the will of its own accord. Philosophers have since developed many other theories of practical rationality and about the relation between reasons and motives. These issues are of particular importance to ethics in addressing the question of the practical moral sceptic (i.e., whether all reasons for action are egoistic or whether there are also reasons for altruism?).
Moral epistemology comprises a set of issues concerned with moral knowledge. Is there moral knowledge? Non-cognitivists, for instance, have a difficult time in accounting for moral knowledge since they insist that moral statements are expressions of attitudes and not propositional. If we have moral knowledge how do we come to know it? Is there a special faculty of moral intuition or do we come to have moral knowledge in just the same way that we come to have other kinds of knowledge? Finally, what is it for a moral belief to be justified? Can our moral beliefs be justified only by coherence with other moral beliefs? Can they be justified at all? (See also Moral Scepticism).
Moral relativism is a form of moral scepticism (see Moral Scepticism) as relativists deny that there are universal moral truths. They do not deny that there are moral truths, they merely insist that moral truths are relative to particular perspectives (e.g., a culture). The most common argument advanced for moral relativism appeals to the variability of moral codes and practices. The difficulty, however, is explaining how these descriptive facts support relativism as variability of belief holds in other domains (e.g., science) where relativism seems less plausible. Nor is it as easy as the relativist may think to support the descriptive claims. Many make mistaken normative inferences from the purported truth of moral relativism—such as that the truth of moral relativism supports toleration of other cultures and ways of life (if the relativist is right, then toleration is just another value which is relative like any other).
Practical ethics (sometimes also called applied ethics) involves a careful philosophical analysis of important and perplexing moral problems with the aim of shedding new light on the issue. Practical ethics has recently spawned the development of entirely new fields such as medical ethics, environmental ethics, and business ethics.
Abortion involves the intentional termination of a foetus. Is abortion morally permissible or impermissible? Much of the debate about this centres on the moral status of the foetus. Is the foetus a person? If so, is it a person from the moment of conception? If not, when does it become a person? If it is a person does it have a right to life? Or is it merely a potential person? Could it have a right to life in virtue of this potentiality? However, another aspect of the debate grants that the foetus has a right to life and then addresses the question of whether even so abortion might be morally permissible (such as in cases of rape, threats to the woman’s welfare, etc.). Another important issue concerns the basis of the woman’s right to choose. Some have recently argued that the debate does not make sense at all as a debate about rights and only makes sense as a debate about the sacred value of human life. Finally, is the state justified in prohibiting or restricting abortion even if it is morally impermissible?
Euthanasia involves the intentional termination of a person’s life for the sake of that person (e.g., to relieve intolerable suffering in the face of an incurable disease). The two main questions concern whether euthanasia is ever morally permissible and if so in what instances it is permissible. Two important distinctions are frequently brought to bear on the debate. First is that between voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary euthanasia (respectively whether the person has chosen, is incapable of choosing, or has not chosen euthanasia). Most proponents of euthanasia restrict themselves to a defence of voluntary and sometimes non-voluntary euthanasia. The other distinction concerns that between active and passive euthanasia. This latter distinction connects up with the status of acts versus omissions and the doctrine of the double effect (see above). Those who argue in favour of euthanasia do so on the grounds that it respects the wishes of the agent and/or prevents human suffering. Those who argue against it do so on the grounds that human life is sacred and/or that to allow euthanasia would devalue human life and possibly create a slippery slope leading to unjustifiable abuses.
Friendships and personal relationships are an important part of human life. One important question, then, is what constitutes a friendship or personal relationship and what is the value of such relationships in life? Sometimes relationships come into conflict with the demands of morality. Morality (or at least many moral theories) requires impartiality while friendships and relationships seem to be essentially partial. So another important question is whether and how these conflicts can be reconciled and if not what the fall out is. Another important issue concerns how to understand morality within relationships. Relationships are fraught with moral problems and dilemmas which seem not to be readily amenable to resolution in terms of ethical concepts such as rights, duties, and justice. Instead ethical concepts such as trust, generosity, and other qualities of character seem more appropriate for handling the morality of relationships. Finally, familial relationships raise special problems such as what obligations parents and children have toward each other.
Human beings are undeniably considered to have moral status (e.g., it is normally wrong to kill them or cause them to suffer). But what about animals? Animals are capable of suffering and many animals exhibit mental capacities well beyond those of some human beings we grant moral status. This places the burden of proof on those who would deny animals moral status. Three views predominate. Some argue that animals have no direct value, but only an indirect value (i.e., cruelty to animals is wrong because it causes humans to suffer or makes us more likely to violate our obligations to other humans). Consequentialists argue that the suffering of animals ought to be weighed equally with the suffering of human beings and that this places considerable limitations on what we may do to them (even if they do not have rights). Other theorists go further and argue that given that we grant moral rights (such as the right not to be killed or tortured) to human infants and the severely mentally impaired we cannot without inconsistency deny such rights to animals. Finally, if animals do have a moral status, then many questions are raised about the morality of rearing animals for fur, factory farming, animal experimentation, and hunting.
What is the moral status of the environment? Many have argued that the environment is valuable only because it is useful to or valued by human beings. However, it has recently been argued that this view is anthropocentric and that a new environmental ethic is called for. The interesting question if anthropocentrism is rejected is how much stronger a view can be put in its place? Do only conscious or sentient beings such as animals have a moral status? What about other living things such as plants? What about collective entities such as species or ecosystems?
What makes killing wrong? Killing is often cited as a paradigmatic example of morally wrong conduct, but it is not so easy to develop a moral theory which provides an account of the wrongness of killing that adequately covers all cases. Is there a moral difference between killing and letting die (see Acts and Omissions and Euthanasia)? When is killing justified? Is it justified in self-defence? Is the killing of the innocent ever justified? There are obvious connections between killing and war. Is war ever justified? If so, under what conditions? Some theorists have attempted to set out criteria for a just war. The existence of nuclear weapons has heightened the stakes and changed the nature of war (as nuclear weapons are possessed precisely in order to deter their use by others) and raises various moral issues and paradoxes.
Much of the world’s population lives in conditions of poverty facing hunger and disease. Much of the rest of the world live in conditions of wealth and abundance. This disparity of wealth raises obvious moral questions about the well-off helping the poor. Is help offered by the well-off a matter of their being charitable or can the poor claim help as a matter of justice? Those who defend the justice view appeal to basic human rights (see Moral Rights). If assistance is a moral obligation, what are its limits? Some argue that our obligations to those in our own society override those to the distant poor. Others have argued that assistance is actually counterproductive.
Sexism and racism are frequently cited as paradigmatic examples of morally wrong practices. But what precisely is it for an action, person, practice, or institution to be sexist or racist? On this question there is considerably less agreement. Consider, for instance, the numerous debates about which practices are discriminatory (e.g., sexual harassment, division of labour, hiring, education, policing, welfare, etc.). Another important issue concerns what ought to be done in response to discriminatory practices. Is it enough to bring them to an end or should positive steps be taken to correct past wrongs and provide compensation? Does the latter constitute ‘reverse’ discrimination? Finally, there are important and difficult questions about whether sexism and racism can be adequately dealt with within a liberal framework or whether these issues go deeper and call for more fundamental and profound social and political reform.
When many people think of morality they think of various prohibitions on sex. Though this is a skewed view about the scope of morality, there are nevertheless important philosophical and moral questions about sexuality. What is sex? Is sex without intimacy morally problematic? Why is rape wrong? Is homosexuality morally wrong? Should any sex acts between consenting adults be proscribed? Is pornography morally objectionable (e.g., because it is morally degrading, because it objectifies women, etc.)? Should the state criminalise pornography and restrict its access?