The philosophy of social science is a curious hybrid combining elements from the philosophies of mind and action, from metaphysics, from the philosophy of science, political philosophy and ethics (among others). This entry focuses only on the topics that have been at the centre of debate in recent years. The social sciences include sociology, psychology, anthropology, economics and archaeology. All those issues in the philosophy of science concerning laws of nature, explanation, confirmation and causation are even more controversial when we are considering the social sciences. One central question that permeates all the debates in the philosophy of social science concerns the relationship of the social to the natural sciences. Should the social sciences adopt the same methods that are employed in the natural sciences? Are the social sciences like sociology reducible to psychology and then to the biological sciences? Should the social sciences even aspire to scientific status or does the study of human beings require a more humanist approach? Whatever philosophical controversy surrounds the natural sciences they have at least enjoyed a great deal of predictive success. The perceived failure of the social sciences to achieve tangible results means that their foundations are very much subject to dispute.
General Reading
Books
- M. Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: an introduction.
- D. Braybrooke, Philosophy of Social Science.
- Fay, B., Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science.
- Little, D., Varieties of Social Explanation.
- Macdonald, G. and Pettit, P., Semantics and Social Science.
- Rosenberg, A. Philosophy of Social Science.
- Ryan, A. The Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
Collections of Articles
- Braybrooke, D. (ed.), Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences.
- Brodbeck, M. (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences.
- Emmet, D. and MacIntyre, A. (eds), Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis.
- F. Hahn and M. Hollis (eds) Philosophy and Economic Theory.
- Krimerman, L.I. (ed.), The Nature and Scope of Social Science.
- Malinowski, B., A Scientific Theory of Culture.
- M.Martin and L.McIntyre, Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science (particularly comprehensive and up to date).
- Natanson, M. (ed.), Philosophy of the Social Sciences: a Reader.
- Ryan, A. (ed.), The Philosophy of Social Explanation.
Cross-cultural understanding and relativism
What is involved in making sense of a society other than our own? Could it be the case that members of other societies employ radically different conceptual schemes and systems of logic to our own? Are the logical, mathematical and other categories that we employ universal? Or are they simply the parochial products of our local culture?
- B.R. Wilson ed., Rationality.
- M. Hollis and S. Lukes eds, Rationality and Relativism.
- G. MacDonald and P. Pettit, Semantics and Social Science, ch. 1.
- Donald Davidson, ‘On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’ in his Essays on Truth and Interpretation.
Interpretation versus Explanation in social science
Are societies best understood on the basis of objective regularities of behaviour that can be summed up in social-scientific laws analagous to the laws of physics? Or does the understanding of human behaviour require an appreciation of the meanings and intentions employed by social actors? On one view, social science involves a search for invariant laws, on the other, social scientists are involved in an interpretive exercise not unlike that engaged in by the translator of a text.
- P. Winch, The Idea of a Social Science.
- C. Taylor, ‘Interpretation and the Sciences of Man’, Review of Metaphysics, 1971.
- M. Hollis, The Cunning of Reason, ch. 1.
- M. Weber, Economy and Society, Part One, ch. 1, §1, A–B.
- G. MacDonald and P. Pettit, Semantics and Social Science, ch. 2.
- Fay, B., Critical Social Science: Liberation and its Limits.
- Outhwaite, W., Understanding Social Life: The Method called Verstehen.
- Rabinow, P. and Sullivan, W. (eds), Interpretive Social Science : a Reader.
- Von Wright, G.H., Explanation and Understanding.
- Weber, M., The Methodology of the Social Sciences. O'Hear, A. (ed.), Verstehen and Humane Understanding
- Part III of Martin, M. and L.McIntyre, L., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Part III.
Individualism versus Collectivism in social explanation.
Are societies reducible to the individuals who make them up? What is meant by ‘reducible’ in the foregoing sentence? On one view of social science, social phenomena should be wholly explicable by reference to the intentions and actions of the individuals who live in society. On another view, social action is best understood as the result of structural features of the social world which pre-empt individual choices.
- D. H. Mellor, ‘The Reduction of Society’, Philosophy, 1982.
- Susan James, The Content of Social Explanation.
- D-H. Ruben, The Metaphysics of the Social World.
- P. Pettit, The Common Mind, chs 3–4.
- G. MacDonald and P. Pettit, Semantics and Social Science, ch. 3.
- Popper, K., The Poverty of Historicism.
- Part VI of Martin, M. and L.McIntyre, L., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Part VI.
The admissibility of functional explanation
Many social scientists have attempted to explain institutions and structures by their (beneficial) consequences for the societies in which the occur. But if the participants in those institutions do not aim at those beneficial consequences but rather at something else, how can such explanations be good ones? Can the anthropologists explanation of the rain dance as occurring to reinforce social solidarity be a good one, given that the dancers are dancing with the aim of making it rain?.
- G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, chs 9–10.
- Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens, ch. 1.
- Jon Elster, ‘Marxism, Functionalism and Game Theory’, Theory and Society 1982.
- G.A. Cohen, ‘Reply to Elster’, Theory and Society 1982.
- G.A. Cohen, ‘Functional Explanation, Consequence Explanantion and Marxism’, Inquiry 1982.
- Martin, M. and L.McIntyre, L., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Part V.
- E. Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method.
- E. Durkheim , Suicide.
- C. Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology.
- Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure.
- Needham, R., Structure and Sentiment.
- Parsons, T., The Social System.
- Radcliffe-Brown, A.R., Method in Social Anthropology.
Fact, value and the idea of a value-free social science
Social science aspires to be ‘scientific’. Many people have thought that this requires seeking a purely factual description of the world without making judgements of value. Others have thought that the very nature of the human world is such that judgements of value are ineliminable from the account we give of it.
- G. MacDonald and P. Pettit, Semantics and Social Science, ch. 4.
- C. Taylor, ‘Neutrality in Political Science’, in Laslett and Runciman (eds), Philosophy, Politics and Society: Third Series.
- M.Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences.
- G.Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Science.
- Martin, M. and L.McIntyre, L., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Part VII.
Ideology and critical theory
The fact that there is a difference between the way society is and the way it appears to be makes social science necessary. The study of ideology is the study of the way in which false appearances and false beliefs about society are systematically generated by the operation of institutions. One influential school of thought – critical theory – has argued that the critique of ideology is closely related to the attainment of autonomy by and the liberation of social agents.
- Karl Marx, Capital, ch. 1, §4.
- Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory.
- Max Horkheimer, ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ in Paul Connerton (ed.) Critical Sociology.
- Michael Rosen, ‘Critical Theory: The Persistence of Philosophy’, in Rosen and Mitchell (eds), The Need for Interpretation.
- Jorge Larrain, The Concept of Ideology.
- Jon Elster, Sour Grapes, ch. 4.
- John Mepham, ‘The Theory of Ideology in Capital’ in John Mepham and D-H. Ruben (eds), Issues in Marxist Philosophy vol. 3.
- Louis Althusser, ‘Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses’ in his Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays.
Problems of social choice and collective action
Social theorists and philosophers have long been aware that there are paradoxes associated with instrumentally rational action in society. Whilst it might be thought that if some good – such as social order – is good for everyone, then each person has a reason to contribute to its production, this turns out not to be true if the account of individual rational action favoured by economists is accepted. Should we accept that social good and individual rationality conflict? Or can we save the day by employing some more sophisticated account of what people have most reason to do?.
- Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.
- Russell Hardin, Collective Action.
- Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Co-Operation.
- Jon Elster (ed.), Rational Choice.
- Paul K. Moser (ed.) Rationality in Action.
- Elster, J and Hylland, A. (eds), Foundations of Social Choice Theory.
- Luce, R.D. and Raiffa, H., Games and Decisions.
- Sen, A., Choice, Welfare and Measurement.
- Martin, M. and McIntyre, L., Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science, Part IV.