Unit information: Epistemology and Metaphysics in 2020/21

Unit name	Epistemology and Metaphysics
Unit code	PHILM0021
Credit points	20
Level of study	M/7
Teaching block(s)	Teaching Block 1 (weeks 1 - 12)
Unit director	Dr. Lena Zuchowski
Open unit status	Not open
Pre-requisites	None
Co-requisites	None
School/department	Department of Philosophy
Faculty	Faculty of Arts

Description including Unit Aims

This is a Masters level foundation course in epistemology and metaphysics, and aims to provide a solid grounding in these central areas of philosophy for all masters and doctoral students in philosophy. The seminar will be based around a close reading of a series of important papers by contemporary philosophers. Topics to be covered will include: existence, identity, modality, causation, probability, knowledge, scepticism, internalism vs. externalism, and others.

The aim of the course is to acquaint students with the state-of-the-art in the contemporary philosophical literature in epistemology and metaphysics, two of the central topics of philosophy. We will read and discuss a selection of the best articles or book chapters that have appeared over the past thirty years. Each week, one of the students will present on the reading for that week; this will be followed by a discussion.

Intended Learning Outcomes

On successful completion of this unit, students should:

1. Have acquired knowledge and understanding of various key issues in metaphysics and epistemology,
2. be able to construct and analyze sophisticated philosophical arguments and engage with other philosophers in constructive debate,
3. be able to communicate ideas clearly and effectively to an audience, using blackboard, handouts, data projection (e.g. PowerPoint).

Teaching Information

Lectures, small group work, individual exercises, seminars and virtual learning environment.

Assessment Information

Summative Assessment: One essay of up to 6,000 words (excluding bibliography) - 100%

Reading and References

Epistemology:

• Ralph Wedgwood, ‘The Aim of Belief’, Philosophical Perspectives, 16, pp.267?97, 2002.
• Thomas Kelly, ‘The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology, 1, pp. 167?96, 2005.
• Jim Pryor, 'The Skeptic and the Dogmatist', Nous, 34(4), 517-549.
• Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008). Alief and Belief. Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.
• Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson (2001) 'Knowing How' Journal of Philosophy 98(8)

Metaphysics:

• Hofweber, Thomas (2007) 'Innocent statements and their metaphysically loaded counterparts' Philosophers Imprint 7(1).
• Hitchcock, Chris (2003) 'Of Humean Bondage' British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54(1): 1-25
• Ned Markosian, ‘A Defense of Presentism’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1, pp. 47?82, 2004
• Sally Haslanger, ‘Persistence, Change, and Explanation’ Philosophical Studies 56 (1989): 1?28
• Judith Jarvis Thomson 'The Statue and the Clay' Nous 1998, 32(2)