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Unit information: MRes Microeconomics 2 in 2020/21

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Unit name MRes Microeconomics 2
Unit code EFIMM0027
Credit points 15
Level of study M/7
Teaching block(s) Teaching Block 2 (weeks 13 - 24)
Unit director Dr. Eugene Jeong
Open unit status Not open
Pre-requisites

MRes Microeconomics I

Co-requisites

None

School/department School of Economics
Faculty Faculty of Social Sciences and Law

Description

The course mainly covers mechanism design, cooperative game theory, and social choice theory. We apply these ideas to auctions, market design, and matching theory. The unit aims to build in students the ability to know, understand, apply and evaluate these tools and to apply themselves when undertaking novel research. Topics covered will include:

1. Incentives and Mechanism Design

- Revelation Principle - Optimal Auction - Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism - Efficient Mechanisms - Bilateral Trading - Bayesian Mechanisms

2. Collusions and Cooperation

- Core - Cooperative Game Theory

3. Social Choice Theory

- Social welfare function - Social choice function - May’s Theorem - Arrow’s Theorem - Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem

4. Auction Theory

- Independent Private Value Model - Revenue Equivalence - Interdependent Model

Intended learning outcomes

This unit follows on from MRes Microeconomics I in providing a thorough and in-depth treatment of further basic concepts in microeconomics and introduces fundamental analytic paradigms rigorously, with a view to equip the students with sufficient foundational understanding of the discipline to be able to access the journal articles first-hand, to evaluate them critically and to start independent research projects.

Teaching details

Teaching will be delivered through a combination of synchronous and asynchronous sessions such as online teaching for large and small group, face-to-face small group classes (where possible) and interactive learning activities

Assessment Details

online exam (85%) and coursework (15%)

Reading and References

Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green (MWG), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1995

Vijay Krishna (K), Auction Theory, Academic Press, 2009

David Kreps, Microeconomic Foundations I: Choice and Competitive Markets, Princeton University Press, 2012

Tilman Borgers, An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Oxford University Press, 2015

Rakesh Vohra, Mechanism Design: A Linear Programming Approach, Cambridge University Press, 2011

Paul Milgrom, Putting Auction Theory to Work, Cambridge University Press, 2004

Paul Klemperer, Auctions: Theory and Practice, Princeton University Press, 2004

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