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Unit information: Philosophical Writing and Research Seminar in 2017/18

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Unit name Philosophical Writing and Research Seminar
Unit code PHILM0025
Credit points 20
Level of study M/7
Teaching block(s) Teaching Block 1 (weeks 1 - 12)
Unit director Dr. Ana-Maria Cretu
Open unit status Not open
Pre-requisites

None

Co-requisites

None

School/department Department of Philosophy
Faculty Faculty of Arts

Description

The seminar identifies distinctive questions and methods of Analytic philosophy; discusses the argumentative and textual strategies of some different historical and contemporary texts; and practice in focusing and structuring written work. Advice on publishing and developing a career in philosophy will be given. Generic academic skills will be taught, e.g. bibliographic practices. Transferable skills will also be covered, such as presentation skills and the use of appropriate ICT.

Intended learning outcomes

On successful completion of this unit, students should:

  1. Have acquired knowledge and understanding of various key issues in central areas of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, moral philosophy, and other areas of value theory,
  2. Be able to construct and analyze sophisticated philosophical arguments and engage with other philosophers in constructive debate. Be able to communicate ideas clearly and effectively to an audience, using blackboard, handouts, data projection (e.g. PowerPoint).

Teaching details

2 hours of seminars each week with student presentations

Assessment Details

Not assessed qualitatively. Formative assessment by seminar participation and seminar presentations.

Reading and References

  • E. Chudnoff (2011) The nature of intuitive justification Phil. Studies, 153 (2) 313 -323
  • Molineux and Earlenbaugh (2009) Intuitions are inclinations to believe, Phil Studies, 145, (1), 89 - 109.
  • C. Nimtz (2010) Saving the doxastic account of intuitions, Philosophical Psychology, 23, (3), 357 - 375.
  • A. Goldman (2007) Philosophical Intuitions, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74, (1), 1-26.ng

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